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ABSTRACT 
This study concentrates specificaUy on assessing those elements of private and external costs and benefits 
which need to be accounted for in analyzing the role of electricity supply in a developing region. To 
facilitate this aim, three interrelated questions are addressed. The first question examines the reasons why a 
critical need for electrification in developing areas exists. In this regard, a selective review of the literature 
on development economics is offered, illuminating the previous neglect of the rural dimension- in 
development and the associated problems of poverty and inequality, a lack of infrastructure and the general 
inability to fulfill basic needs. 
The second question is devoted exclusively to an economic analysis of the supply of electricity in developing 
areas. A broad theoretical review on whether an unregulated or regulated (private or public) sector should 
be responsible for the provision of electrification is presented. This evaluation highlights the various welfare 
implications and efficiency considerations that appear to be relevant in the present context. 
The final question, which constitutes the central proposition of the thesis, establishes how electrification 
should be supplied in developing areas. To this end, the conditions specific to a region in Venda are 
discussed. An attempt is made to identify the private and external costs and benefits relating to electricity 
supply and the corresponding costs and benefits pertaining to alternative sources of energy. Since the 
incidence and nature of these costs and benefits could only be ascertained from individual households, it 
was deemed necessary to undertake a questionnaire study of residents in Makwarela township and its peri-
urban settlement of Lufule-Tshisele. 
A number of basic trends were evident from the research results. As far as the various benefits are 
concerned, respondents tended to place a much higher value on both the private and external benefits 
associated \vith electricity than its alternatives. At the same time, the survey found that although the private 
(or monetary) cost of electricity far exceeded the corresponding cost of alternative energy sources, the 
external costs were significant in the case of alternative energy sources, but virtually non-existent in the case 
of electricity. 
On the whole, the Venda survey seems to suggest that an economic case can be made for involving the 
broader community in subsidising the supply of electricity in Makwarela, Lufule-Tshisele and other areas. 
While such a subsidy can perhaps be justified on distribution grounds alone, and more specifically in terms 
of the rapid and pronounced effect it is likely to have on the quality of life in the region, its real worth lies in 
the fact that it may confer certain external benefits on the community. 
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CHAPTERl 
. INTRODUCTION 
Generally speaking, developing countries represent the largest and most urgent sphere of economic need in 
the world. The term 'developing countries' is used in the broad sense to include those countries where there 
is widespread absolute poverty and inequality. The general rule in conventional economic analysis is that 
significant economic development needs to be sustained in countries with these problems. In this study, 
emphasis is placed on the fact that infrastructural development may be viewed as a necessary though not 
sufficient condition for economic development. Usually infrastructuial development has a strong influence 
on both social and economic upliftment and on the productivity of a country's population. For example, 
electricity supply - which forms an integral part of the infrastructure of a country - becomes an important 
part of development. It is an essential input in most industries and assists in the provision of services such 
as health care, water supply, transportation and communications. Electricity supply also absorbs a large 
proportion of total capital expenditure. When associated with mechanisation and industrialisation, 
electricity supply becomes important in that the resulting effects are high levels of output accompanied by 
lower unit costs. This is true in both the public and private sectors, in both rural and urban areas and across 
a wide spectrum of business activities. Thus, it must be appreciated that for economic development to 
occur, infrastructural development may be viewed as providing the inputs and services necessary to 
generate higher levels of national output. 
In a less·developed region where a large proportion of the population lives, however, infrastructural 
development should be considered in the context of the related problems found in these areas.1 While the 
above conclusion concerning infrastructural and economic development implies that the quantity and 
nature of electricity used by society is correlated to levels of social and economic development, the 
1. The term "less developed" or "rural" region is used in this thesis in the broad sense to include all areas 
outside the metropolis and big towns in developing countries. Areas such as emerging urban centres, 
peri·urban areas, closer settlements, settlement schemes, villages, farm settlements as well as widely 
scattered rural dwellings are all included in this list of rural life. The term is not confined strictly to the 
conventional countryside conditions characterised by poorer rural people whom Chambers (1978, 209) 
defmes as ' ... hard to reach, typically unorganized, inarticulate, often sick, seasonally hungry and quite 
frequently dependent on local patrons. They are less educated, less likely to use government services 
and less likely to visit outside their home areas than their better-off rural neighbours. They are often 
especially concentrated in regions remote from urban centres. Further, they are relatively invisible, 
especially the women and children'. 
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relationship between electricity consumption and development is complex and is still inadequately 
understood. Many people believe that there is little basis for the assertion that a causative relationship 
between electricity consumption and development exists. Electricity use is regarded as only one element 
within wider social, economic and environmental factors that contribute to economic development. 
In modern societies, electricity - in its non-natural state - is regarded as an essential and convenient form of 
energy despite its relatively high cost. It is one of many types of energy which can be easily converted for 
use in the provision of heat and light and in generating mechanical power in certain chemical processes 
(Crew and Kleindorfer 1979, 159). 
The above outline of electricity usage contrasts with most alternative energy sources which, apart from 
petroleum for transport, are used solely as sources of heat. Electricity is also versatile insofar as the choice 
of fuels from which it can be generated is concerned (Cottrell 1955, 98). Though coal and oil are the most 
widely used fuels, electricity may be generated by use of peat, wood, industrial waste or domestic refuse. 
Electricity may also be obtained from the use of nuclear energy and from a range of renewable energy 
sources including hydro-electric schemes, wave power generators, tidal barrages, windmills and geothermal 
energy schemes. 
Electricity is an efficient form of energy for providing power as required for water pumping, process 
machinery, electric transport and cooling/ventilation purposes. It also provides more flexibility than other 
heating sources, often offsetting the lower overall efficiencies. Furthermore, for lighting purposes, there are 
few alternatives to electricity. The growth of electricity networks has, according to Berrie (1978, 2) been 
consistently faster than the average for the economy in both developed and developing countries alike. 
The advantages of electricity must, however, be viewed in the context of the fact that electrical energy must 
be supplied from the source at the exact moment that it is required by a consumer. Except for storage in 
other energy forms such as in pumped-hydro schemes, it is not yet feasible to store large quantities of 
electricity economically as can be done with diesel or other primary energy sources. Large scale storage at 
the point of consumption is practically impossible. As a result, the required distribution system for 
electricity is such that a supply facility suitable for each consumer's power requirements is necessary. 
As an "indispensable" service, by reason of its pervasive role in production and consumption and by reason 
of the absence of close substitutes, electricity assumes a position of such ever-increasing importance in 
almost every facet of daily activities - in the home, commerce, entertainment and industry - that an 
interruption of supply for more than an hour or two in most highly developed communities can almost 
assume disaster dimensions (Shepherd and Gies 1966, 90). It is therefore often dilficult to provide a 
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comprehensive account of the economic importance of electricity. In view of these factors, countries should 
consider the supply of electricity as one of their most important industries. 
In most developed countries, the electricity supply industry is generally capable of meeting the demands 
placed upon it, and there is a close correlation between the size of the industry and the level of economic 
activity. By contrast, most developing countries lack the fundamental electricity supply necessary to allow 
rapid economic development. Frequently, only an inadequate electricity supply system exists with no supply 
at all in many areas. There is thus a severe shortage of houses, schools and other social infrastructural 
services that are adequately electrified. 
Consid~ring the contribution which electricity supply can make to the process of development and the size 
of the investment required, it is surprising that so little appears to have been written on the role of 
electricity in developing countries. In some cases, detailed targets are set in these countries for the number 
of jobs, factories, hospital beds, the intake of children into schools o~ the length of railroads that are to be 
built. However, there is seldom any discussion of the implications of these goals for the electricity supply 
industry. In general, development plans are specified in detail, but little or no attention is paid to the 
electrical requirements that are necessary to facilitate their realisation. Where reference is made to these 
needs, there is often little attention paid to the social and economic benefits and costs that could arise from 
electrification. 
Given that electricity has a significant role to play in the process of development and is one of the largest 
and most influential industries in a developing country, the thesis itself addresses three interrelated 
questions. The first qnestion examines the reasons why a critical need for electrification in developing areas 
exists. To this end, a literature review of rural development is offered, illuminating the previous neglect of 
the rural dimension in development and the problems of widespread and growing inequality, poverty, a lack 
of infrastructure and a general inability to fulm basic needs. 
The second question is devoted exclusively to an economic analysis of the supply of electricity in developing 
areas. A broad theoretical review on whether an unregulated or regulated sector (private or public) should 
be responsible for the provision of electrification is presented. This evaluation outlines the welfare 
implications and efficiency considerations that appear to be relevant for the purpose of this study. 
The final question, which constitutes the central proposition of the thesis, establishes how electrification 
should be supplied in developing areas. To this end the conditions specific to a region in Venda are 
discussed, looking at the costs and benefits relating to electricity supply and the corresponding costs and 
benefits pertaining to alternative sources of energy. Since statistical data suitable for testing the conditions 
in question is limited in most of the existing studies, it was deemed necessary to conduct interviews with 
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relevant authorities as well as undertake a survey among residents in an emerging urban residential 
township, Makwarela, and its peri-urban settlement area, Lufule-Tshisele. 
Against lhis background, the study will specifically concenlrate on assessing those elements of private and 
external costs and benefits which need to be accounted for in analysing the role of electricity supply in the 
process of development in Venda. In order to avoid confusion, it is considered appropriate at this stage to 
define, quite specifically, what is meant by the terms 'private' and 'external' costs and benefits. This 
clarification is of much importance because of the fact that the same words may mean different things to 
different people, particularly with respect to a complex subject such as electrification. 
In a conventional sense, private benefits are those benefits which accrue solely to the individual utilising the 
goods and sen;ces that are being provided by a given project or programme. Theoretically, the real value of 
these benefits is the maximum amount of money which the consumers are willing to pay for them. In 
electricity supply, the convenience, flexibility and adaptability of eiectricity compared to other forms of 
energy and its resultant influence on the quality of life, are of particular importance in the domain of 
private benefits. External benefits, on the contrary, refer to those gains which accrue not only to the 
indi,·idual or agency taking the decision to make use of the goods and services which can be provided by a 
given project or program, but to society as a whole. In electricity supply, external benefits include, inter alia, 
the contribution of electricity to the alleviation of slum conditions and crime as well as health improvement 
through the avoidance of exposure to poisonous gases. 
While private costs are those borne by the beneficiaries of a given project or programme and which must 
be incurred in order to realise the full value of the benefits, external costs are the total costs incurred, 
including both the costs borne by the individual beneficiaries and society in general. In electricity supply, 
private costs include, inter alia, all ftnancial expenses associated with the generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity which are borne by the authorities involved in the construction and operation of 
the project. All monetary expenditure for the services of electricity made by consumers as well as the loss of 
and damage to private property and appliances as a result of the vulnerability of electricity to lightning and 
other disturbances may also be included in the list of private costs. Examples of external costs that are 
associated with electrification may include the threat to human and animal life (accidental and nre risk) and 
other environmental costs such as scarred and unproductive land, deterioration of the quality of air and 
water and aesthetic costs. 
An important consideration arising from the above description is that certain costs and benefits, though 
recognised in a general way, cannot be measured in monetary terms. This illustrates the relevance of a 
qualitative cost-benefit analysis (CBA) which is generally regarded as a useful approach to addressing the 
problems of evaluation where market data is inadequate. Another reflection is that the above 
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characterization addresses both the supply and demand side of the electricity supply industry. While the 
supply side gives insight into the contribution that electricity may make towards economic and social 
development, the demand side addresses both the willingness of the population and their ability to purchase 
electricity at the going price. In economic theory, willingness alone is not effective in the market - it must be 
backed by the ability to pay for electricity services. 
The thesis is structured in the following way: 
Chapter 2 is devoted to a background of economic development and electricity supply in order to facilitate 
a better understanding of the conditions in the study areas. Chapter 3 gives some information on the 
impor~ant public utility aspects of electricity supply. Chapter 4 looks exclusively at the theoretical issues of 
the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) technique. Chapter 5 presents a brief discussion of the data collection and 
processing procedures employed in the survey, while Chapter 6 gives a detailed summary of the survey 
results. Chapter 7 contains the conclusions and several recommendations relating to the continued supply 
of electricity in Venda. 
Appendix A contains a copy of the questionnaire used in the survey. 
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PART ONE: PRINCIPLES OF DEVELOPMENT AND 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
In this section, basic theoretical arguments on aspects of development economics and electricity supply are 
examined - with particular emphasis placed on the assertion that the supply of electricity has a significant 
role in the development of underdeveloped regions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In most of the current international theory and writing on questions of economic development, a strong 
emphasis is placed on the assertion that an improvement in the living standard or the quality of life of the 
poor should be afforded priority in developing countries. This implies that for most of these economies, 
emphasis should be directed to combating the widespread poverty and ine"qualities and shlfting the 
distribution of resources in favour of the poor. As remarked earlier, electricity supply is an important part 
of development in those economies characterised by pervasive poverty and inequality. In order to fully 
appreciate this scenario, it is necessary to review the relevant theoretical work with particular emphasis on 
those that show how the less developed regions in most countries have been neglected. While the first 
sections of this chapter review the historical theories and conditions of economic underdevelopment, the 
concluding parts refer specifically to the basic needs approach (BNA) and the role of electricity in meeting 
these basic needs. 
2.2 DEVELOPMENT VERSUS GROwrn: A HISTORICAL REVIEW 
The concept of economic development is not clearly defined and it sometimes causes confusion. This 
confusion arises from the various interpretations which have been attaehed to the concept as well as the 
misconception of what it means and what is involved in it. The concept of economic development is 
frequently confused with that of economic growth. This is so because since the early 1950s and 196Os, 
development activity has been directed at expanding per capita gross national product (GNP). The 
intention was to create more jobs and income and therefore place more spending power in the hands of the 
population. This attitude was widely held in development circles - with the consensus that economic growth 
should be the measure of success. Accordingly, Goldstein (1985, 596) points out that ' ... economic growth 
was the reigoing fashion of political economy. It was simultaneously the hottest subject of economic theory 
and research, a slogan eagerly claimed by politicians of aU stripes, and a serious objective of the policies of 
governments ... ". 
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Furthermore, economic growth was viewed as the most effective way of eradicating poverty. The 
justification for this view was the belief that the gains from economic growth would automatically "triele 
down" to the poor and their benefits would spread through market forces, raising demand for labour, 
raising its productivity and raising wages or lowering prices (Streeten 1979, 29; Coetzee 1983, 29). Countries 
were expected to attain a higher degree of industrialisation and urbanisation, with the society enjoying mass 
consumption of material goods. Pro-growth development economists such as Nurkse (1953), Lewis (1955) 
and Rosenstein-Rodan (1961), advocated that maximising the rate of growth of the industrialisation process 
through the concentration of investment in the urban industrial sector of the economy would both generate 
resources to expand the economy as a whole and distribute welfare throughout the population through the 
expansion of employment opportunities. The traditional sector, the latecomer to development, would, in the 
process, undergo gradual erosion and eventually 'catch-up' with the industrialised sector. This implies that 
development of rural areas was not of primary concern_ The rural sector was generally viewed as a reservoir 
supplying food, raw materials and labour to industry (Lee 1980, 99). Agriculture was regarded as the 
traditional sector and was characterised by diminishing returns and a significant surplus of labour. This 
labour, in turn, was seen to contribute little or nothing to total output in the agricultural sector. As a 
consequence, growth maximisation and industrialisation were taken as the twin and mutually supportive 
objectives of development (Stewart 1985, 8). 
Contrary to expectations, however, this evaluation of development in terms of GNP growth criteria did not 
lead to the expected increase in the welfare of the poor countries. The accumulated weight of empirical 
evidence pointed out that since the mid-1960s, economic growth was often accompanied by increasing 
dualism. Two economic sectors were identifiable. There was a large-scale mannfacturing or capital-
intensive sector which was generally the focus of modernisation and maintained links with the developed 
world, expanding alongside a traditional sector characterised by indigenous, labour-intensive methods and 
slow growth or stagnation_ The only beneficiaries of industrialisation appeared to be the small urban elite 
who possessed scarce skills vital to the functioning of the modern sector. This implies that although rapid 
GNP growth through investment in capital-intensive industries was occurring, ouly a limited number of 
people were benefitting. The majority were still the victims of escalating unemployment and persistent rural 
poverty and inequality. These factors were exacerbated by unanticipated increases in the rates of population 
growth and migration. This rural-urban exodus, in turn, had far-reaching consequences - the prime one 
being a shortage of agricultural manpower which existed alongside urban unemployment. Not only are the 
benefits of growth being viewed as having failed to trickle-down to the poverty groups of the population, but 
economic growth is seen as having led to their absolute impoverishment (Ghai 1977, 2; Keeton 1984, 2) . 
This implies that a 'trickle-up' instead of a 'trickle-down' effect may have resulted_ 
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By the late-196Os, policy emphasis had changed to a structuralist approach of redistribution-with-growth as 
well as employment-oriented approaches which had more than GNP growth as goals. While the 
redistribution-with-growth approach suggested that intervention through government policy was deemed 
necessary to boost the provision and distribute the benefits of economic growth more equitably throughout 
society, the major focus of employment-oriented approaches' was to reduce the capital intensity of modern-
sector activities. In the early 1970s, these broadly redistributive or anti-poverty ideologies came under 
attack from several quarters. More precisely, evidence suggested that they tended to be aimed at specific 
target groups, with the familiar lack of widespread success (Stewart 1985, 11). As a result, the poor 
continued to be impoverished and the gap between rich and poor became increasingly marked. 
Today.however, a major rethink concerning the question of economic development in developing countries 
has taken place. Economic development is no longer exclusively linked to economic growth. Most 
economists now define economic development in terms of the reduction of poverty within a growing 
economy. Nattrass (1980, 58) contends that as a process, economic development should focus not only on 
improving the distribution of income (Le. the elimination of poverty in a relative sense) but also on the 
elimination of poverty in the absolute sense. Likewise Meier (1976, 9) and Streeten (1979, 30) regard 
economic development as an attack on the chief evils of the world today: malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, 
slums, unemployment and inequality. This is an important attack because of the far-reaching consequences 
of these evils. In particular, severe and widespread malnutrition may seriously and permanently damage 
intellectual and creative abilities with concomitant effects on productivity, technological progress and 
overall growth (Bequele and Freedman 1979, 327). Furthermore evidence suggests that income, wealth and 
consumption inequalities disrupt a commurtity and may be a major source of political instability (Diwan and 
Livingstone 1979, 72; Coetzee 1983, 30). Along similar lines, the existence of large-scale poverty is likely to 
impede growth and development through its impact on the accumulation of human capital, on the level of 
domestic saving as well as on the size and rate of growth of the local market for goods and services and on 
average levels and rates of growth in labour productivity. 
Economic development is thus associated with a process of " ... growth with a change in production 
techniques, consumer behaviour, consumption patterns and in the distribution of resources through the 
economy" (Erskine 1985, 369). This means that it is seen as a process of economic and social 
transformation within countries. On a more comprehensive basis, Thirlwall (1974, 23) and Laker (1980,99) 
maintain that economic development should encompass progressive changes which embrace both 
horizontal and vertical dimensions: more hectares under production and higher production per hectare, 
, 
more people educated and more education per individual, more factories and better quality products, more 
and better roads and more and better teachers. 
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Little purpose can be served by presenting yet another proposed list of views on the definition of economic 
development. These views will undeniably include many of the points made above. However, one important 
conclusion which emerges from the above views is that attention is now increasingly being focussed on the 
rural sector. Development thinking now effectively challcnges the persistence of widespread inequality and 
poverty as well as the inability to fulfil basic needs. Consequently the main thrust of a successful economic 
development strategy is today seen to be one that includes within its framework, policies that would 
alleviate thesc conditions as quickly as possible, whilst at the same time providing an overall foundation for 
a healthy economic future. 
Essentially the definition of economic development has been discussed in this section with the intention of 
presenting a framework for examining the role of electricity supply in development in a developing country. 
To do so, the general characteristics of developing countries must be identified before the role of electricity 
supply in their development can be considered. 
2.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE NATURE 
OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
The concept of underdevelopment is relative or more accurately, relational. In a conventional sense, it is a 
state of societal well·being wmch in relation to conditions elsewhere, is far from satisfactory. In developing 
countries, the production sector is generally still dominated by agriculture. These countries are in the 
process of building up industrial capacity. In addition the flow of goods and services are so small that the 
problem becomes one of allocation of existing scarce resources so as to acllleve rapid and widespread 
improvements in the standard of living. Frcqucntly, secondary industry and service sectors are immature 
and incomplete while an inadequate electricity supply system cxists, with many areas having no supply at all. 
Similar shortages are found in transport, communications and public services as well as in the entire 
physical, social and administrative infrastructure. Even where these services do exist, the poor often do not 
have access to them because organisation is inadequate and the cost is mgh. In a comparative study 
covering four selected countries (two developed and two developing) in 1981, Cole (1981, 36) discovered 
that in relation to developed countries, both the generation and production capacities of electricity were 
very little or nothing in developing countries (see Table 2.1) . 
Contrary to the above scenario, developed countries include those wmch have acmeved substantial 
manufacturing and service capability in addition to advanced techniques in agriculture and raw material 
extraction. A large stock of capital is normally available, and this is applied mostly for investment, 
industrialisation and physical infrastructure, as well as for the administrative and legal machinery necessary 
to operate an economy. Furthermore, in these countries electricity supply has developed to the point where 
economic requirements can be served as they arise. 
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TABLE 2.1: ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION AND GENERATION IN FOUR SELECTED 
COUNTRIES, 1981 
Developed Developing 
countries countries 
USA Italy Thailand Bangladesh 
Electricity generating capacity (%) 100 32 2 (D)' 
Electricity production capacity (%) 100 28 2 (0) 
'(D) = Under 0,50% 
Source: Cole J.P. (1981): The Development gap: a spatial analysis of world poverty and IneqUality. New 
York: John Wiley. 
2.3.1 The rural-urban divide 
The rural-urban division that is characteristic of the development process in most developing countries can 
be explained by the theory of cumulative causation and the theory of rural-urban migration. 
The theory of cumulative causation spells out the conditions that cause and accelerate regional growth and 
the concentration of economic activity in specific regions within a national economy and/or in specific 
centres within regions. In this regard, Myrdal (1963, 26) suggests that if left unchecked, market forces 
would result in a concentration not only of industrial production, commerce, banking, insurance, shipping 
and almost all economic activities, but also of cultural heritage in fields such as science, art, literature, 
education and higher culture. 
The process of cumulative causation evolves through the working of labour migration, capital movement 
and trade. These aspects are regarded as the media through which the process causes some areas to grow 
cumulatively richer whilst others fall even further behind in relative terms (Thirlwall 1983, 136; Williamson 
1965, 6). As an example, it is argued that due to internal and external economies associated with the mass 
concentration of capital projects in the developed urban regions, capital emigrates from the less developed 
(rest of the country) to the developed areas, thereby accelerating interregional inequality and widening the 
innbalance. 
The increased attractiveness of existing growth centres, sets in motion a chain of the so-called "backwash" 
effects which operate to the detrinnent of the less developed regions. For example, Truu (1973, 100) points 
out that the fIrst effects of labour migration would be a reduction in the demand for fmal output in the 
depressed non-industrial and non-urban region with a concomitant increase in the prosperous region. This 
initiates a negative employment-output multiplier process in the depressed region with the opposite 
occurring in the prosperous one. 
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The negative influence of these "backwash" effects is countered to a degree by the so-called "spread" or 
"trickle-down" effects which emerge from the growth centres. These consist mainly of increased demand for 
less developed regions' products and the diffusion of technology and knowledge. 
Whether the "spread" effects are sufficient to neutralise the "backwash" effects seems to depend to a large 
extent upon the level of economic development of the country. In Myrdal's view, the higher the level of 
economic development attained, the stronger the spread effects will usually be. However, he argues that the 
"spread" effects are weaker than the "backwash" effects and this implies that as a rule, the free play of the 
market forces in a poor country will work more powerfully to create regional inequalities and to widen 
those which already exist (Myrdal 1963, 32). This is likely to occur because in poor areas, poverty and the 
inefficiellt utilisation of resources which it implies, will limit the area's potential for economic growth, while 
in rich areas, a fuller utilisation of resources and a greater capacity for economic growth will be possible. 
An important policy measure whereby the "spread" effects can be strengthened and help to neutralise the 
"backwash" effects is perhaps the use of rural development programmes. These should focus, inter alia On 
infrastructural development of electricity, water supply, roads and other services. Such infrastructural 
developments naturally give rise to enhanced agricultural production, encourages the development of rural, 
small-scale industries as well as the extension of job opportunities and the provision of basic needs. The 
development of these programmes, however, depends heavily on overall government policy. 
Addressing the same fundamentals, the theory of rural-urban migration explains the increased migration of 
people from less developed rural to higher developed urban areas, thereby perpetuating what Lipton (1977, 
16) calls "urban bias" in the overall development process. This continual migration is considered by many 
economists (e.g. Amin 1974; Todaro 1969; Portes 1978; Rogers and Williamson 1982; Peak 1982 and 
Shrestha 1987) to exacerbate urban unemployment problems and to deplete the rural countryside of 
valuable human capital. In particular, Little et a1. (1970, 85) point out that migration into cities " ... creates a 
great need for infrastructure investment: urban housing, drainage, electricity, transport, schools and various 
other public utilities. Attempts to meet this need have (often) diverted a part of the limited investable funds 
from ' investment in productive capacity where it would have created more employment opportunities". 
The underlying assumption is that migrants are an economic liability in the urban setting because of the 
heavy burdens they impose on public, social and economic services as well as their posing a political threat. 
In order to limit the flow of rural-urban migration, thereby reducing unemployment and other associated 
problems, it is suggested by many observers that a reorientation of economic activity and social investments 
towards the rural sector should be afforded priority. From a policy viewpoint, the main objective of this 
approach is to decentralise development activities and directly attack the presumed source of poverty which 
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generates migration streams to the cities. Presumably these development activities would discourage 
migration by providing incentives for potential migrants in villages, thereby making villages more 
economically attractive. 
2.3.2 Bias against agriculture 
In addition to the reasons for urban bias and rural underdevelopment previously outlined, it is essential to 
recognise that, in most developing countries, there are several inappropriate economic policies which 
promote a bias against the agricultural sector. This bias is prevalent in spite of the fact that governments in 
these countries do attempt to provide the poor with an adequate diet and promote a more productive and 
efficient. agricultural sector. As a result of this bias, the sector remains largely underutilised and contributes 
only to a limited extent to further economic development. To this end, the World Bank (1986, 85) 
maintains, for example, that in most developing countries, consumers are subsidised in order to help the 
poor, but these policies end up in reducing the incomes of farmers, who are sometimes poorer than many 
of the urban consumers who benefit from the subsidies. Furthermore, taxes imposed on agricultural exports 
tend to decrease commodity prices in the farm sector. As a consequence, the growth of agricultural 
production is limited and the efforts towards reducing rural poverty are hampered. The main source of this 
discrimination against agriculture lies in the developing countries' policy of promoting domestic industries 
through a shift in resources out of agriculture toward the industrial sector. 
This is in direct contrast with the objectives of agricultural policies in industrial countries, which are aimed 
at stabilising and increasing farmers' incomes and slowing the migration of people out of this sector. 
2.3.3 The state of electricity supply 
Turvey and Anderson (1977, 155) have described four coordinated phases of electrification schemes. The 
initial phase is one in which private generation is of prime importance. There are a few scattered and 
isolated businesses that need electricity, as well as being able to afford it. Electricity is, at this stage, 
obtainable by installation of generators and it fmds use in such purposes as refrigeration, lighting and 
heating on farms, refrigeration and lighting in shops, refrigeration on a large scale in slaughter houses as 
well as meeting the machinery power needs of large agro-industries such as sugar processing. The power 
needs of small farms and businesses are, in this phase, generally provided directly by animals or by small 
diesel engines. 
The development of electricity needs is introduced in phase two, where the collective demand of several 
households and businesses needs to be met. Electricity use may be extended to such areas as public and 
private lighting. In addition, large and small businesses and farms may make further demands. During this 
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phase, small local networks or "microgrids" are usually drawn from local autogenerators (isolated 
generators powered by diesel engines, small steam turbines or microhydro turbines) installed through 
public or private initiative. 
Phase three, which involves fully-fledged electrification using the main grid system, arises when collective 
demand becomes large enough and offers economies of scale.1 The microgrids are taken over and 
extended, ",-jth subtransmission links being introduced in place of old autogenerators. The latter may either 
be scrapped or frnd alternative uses. During this phase, businesses can turn to electricity as a source of 
machine power in preference to animals or diesel engines and may, as a consequence, even introduce some 
new processes. A number of major demand centres can be identified in a region resulting from the 
demands of larger villages, farms and industries that lie outside of them. To minimise the significant cost of 
subtransmission and distribution lines which may emanate from such demand centres, a need arises for a 
design to route the electricity network. 
In the fourth and tinal phase, low demand centres may be connected to adjacent main networks already 
established in the region. This could possibly be carried out at very low marginal cost. 
Against this background, Turvey and Anderson (1977, 158) contend that most African developing countries 
are largely in the first phase of private generators and are only gradually beginning both the second and 
third phases. Furthermore, while Asian Middle Eastern and North African developing countries are mostly 
in the midst of the third phase, most Latin American developing countries are in the fourth and final phase. 
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the study by Turvey and Anderson is that 
electrification is inadequate in most developing countries. This is especially true since electrification 
comprises a comparatively new field of investment in most of these countries. This inadequacy affects and 
retards the pace and pattern of development of both industrial and rural areas, and is compounded by the 
fact that most developing countries face an "energy crisis" situation - one in which people in the rural areas 
depend overwhelmingly on diminishing fuelwood resources and other traditional, non-commercial fuels 
such as animal dung, leaves and crop residues. These materials are used as the principal source of energy 
for cooking, space and water heating, lighting and other rural households needs. For many people, it is a 
problem of survival illustrated by the fact that these resources are almost exclusively used for life-sustaining 
activities. The World Bank (1981, 40) reports that in many of these developing countries, industries also 
rely heavily on fuelwood and in some countries - Mali, Tanzania, Nepal, Ethiopia and Haiti being notable 
examples - traditional fuels represent over 90% of total energy consumption. Eden et al. (1981, 354) adds 
1. The main or national grid system is the network of power lines from the power stations to the cities, 
towns, rural and residential areas where electricity is used (ESCOM Databank, July 1986). 
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that in India, fuelwood, cow dung and other farm waste provide 80% of the energy used for cooking and 
other domestic purposes, while in China the figure is probably similar. Although statistical evidence is not 
available, straw is a very important component of the fuel used for domestic heating and cooking in the 
rural areas of China, while coal is used extensively in towns. 
Furthermore, poorer urban and peri-urban households in developing countries generally do not have 
electricity. These households rely on inconvenient and expensive fuels such as paraffin, gas, candles, 
batteries and fuelwood has recently become increasingly expensive. This places a heavy burden on the 
population, both in terms of the direct private costs and external costs such as pollution. In particular, 
fuelwood is no longer a free resource to which everyone has a traditional right. Abundant resources of 
wood in the form of indigenous forests no longer exist. Wood from commercial forests is expensive, both in 
terms of cost and transportation, and collecting of dung is an extremely time-consuming task. To cite some 
cases, Eberhard (1983, 2) discovered that receding woodland has meant longer trips for fuelwood collection 
- a task which has become increasingly arduous for women and children. In the Herschel district in 
Transkei, it has been observed that the average journey to fetch bundles of wood weighing up to 54 kg each 
lasted 4 hours and that approximately 15 hours a week could be spent on this task. In addition, Gandar 
(1984, 3) reports that in the Mahlabathini district in KwaZulu, the average time spent collecting wood 
varies between 9 hours 5 minutes and 6 hours 45 minutes per household per week in the high grassland 
areas and in the valley lowveld areas respectively. The average distance walked to collect one headload 
varies between 8,3 km and 3,6 km. In one extreme case, Gandar reports that a group of women were 
observed to have walked a round trip of 19 km, spending 9,5 hours in gathering a 40 kg headload each. 
These problems are prevalent in most developing countries, and South Africa is no exception. In South 
Africa, wbere much of the population live in conditions similar to those found in the Third World, it is 
therefore to be expected that households in the rural and peri-urban areas would rely heavily on fuelwood 
and other inconvenient fuels to meet their domestic energy requirements. For example, a nationwide study 
on the quality of life undertaken in 1983 by tbe Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of 
Natal in conjunction with the Human Sciences Research Council indicates that a high percentage of the 
population living in black townships place a heavy reliance on candles for lighting purposes (77%) and 
paraffin for cooking (71%) and heating (52%) purposes (see Table 2.2). Similar trends were recorded in 
the peri-urban and rural areas as well as for blacks residing on white farms. For the latter two areas, 
however, fuelwood is preferred to paraffin for cooking and heating purposes. Particularly striking in all four 
areas of tbe study was the low percentage of electricity use - the highest percentage recorded being 29% for 
lighting purposes in the townships. This state of affairs in South Africa is worsened by disparities in the 
availability of modern energy. 
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TABLE 2.2: FUEL CONSUMPTION IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY: SOUTH AFRICA, 1983 
Percentage using different types of fuel for purposes of 
Area Lighting (%) Cooking (%) Heating (%) 
RURALa 
Electricity 3 2 2 
Wood 2 88 81 
Dung 1 32 30 
Coal 1 52 51 
Candles 94 - -
Paraffm/Petroleum 74 70 48 
Gas 4 6 4 
.. 
WHITE FARMSb 
Electricity 10 2 1 
Wood 5 93 83 
Dung 0 37 31 
Coal 0 19 16 
Candles 90 
- -
Paraffm/Petroleum 67 52 33 
Gas 2 2 1 
TOWNSHIpc 
Electricity 29 24 19 
Wood 2 38 26 
Dung 0 2 1 
Coal 3 47 38 
Candles 77 . . 
Paraffm/Petroleum 53 71 52 
Gas 8 14 8 
PERI.URB~ 
Electricity 1 1 1 
Wood 4 30 28 
Dung 0 1 1 
Coal 0 9 8 
Candles 93 . -
Paraffm/ Petroleum 70 88 75 
Gas 5 7 5 
Source: Moller V. (1985): Rural Blacks' Perception of Basic Needs Fulftlment: South African National 
Scientific Programmes Report No. 116. Pretoria. 
a Blacks living in the rural areas. This category comprises roughly equal numbers of persons residing 
in the remoter country districts. Such as traditional, planned and resettlement areas and on mission 
land in KwaZulu and Lebowa. 
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b A spatial category of rural blacks consisting of persons living and working on white farms in the 
Pietersburg district and Natal. 
c Urban township blacks living in Soweto and townships in the Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Port 
Elizabeth and Durban areas, as well as towns in the Eastern Transvaal and KwaZulu. 
d Peri-urban blacks living in shack areas to the north and south of Durban. 
Recent figures presented by the Escom Databank News (1987, 6) indicate that of South Africa's total 
population (about 31,4 million in 1984), about 22 million do not have access to electricity and have to use 
coal, gas, paraffm, batteries and fast diminishing supplies of wood to meet their basic energy requirements. 
The implication is that although approximately 60% of the total electricity supply in Africa is generated by 
South_Africa, and Escom today still ranks amongst the top seven electricity producers in the world, the 
majority of South Africans do not have access to its benefits. The provision of electricity seems to be 
confmed, in the main, to white urban areas and farms, with the majority of the people remaining dependent 
on traditional fuels. 
The costs involved in using traditional and relatively inefficient forms of energy technology in developing 
countries are extensive, chiefly in terms of detrimental effects on the environment and lifestyles of the 
populace, particularly in health, welfare and comfort levels. Most academic analysts of energy use agree 
that in urban areas, flIe hazards, smoke pollution and bad reading light have become major problems. In 
the rural areas, bad reading light is accompanied by the more serious problem of deforestation. The 
depletion of forests caused by increasing wood fuel consumption and the use of substitutes such as dung 
and other wastes, seriously threaten soil fertility, water retention, crop yields and the availability of livestock 
feed in regions that depend for their survival on the agricultural sector. 
The success with which these costs can be minimised and eventually eliminated depends on the 
acceptability of electricity amongst the poor in developing countries and the realisation that it can make an 
important contribution to agricultural, industrial and social development. This would occur by way of its 
application in irrigation projects, agricultural processing and sawmills. Further, it can significantly influence 
leisure activities at community centres such as municipalities and missions. In this regard, it is difficult to 
envisage any satisfactory development pattern for the less-developed countries which would not involve a 
very substantial increase in electricity consumption. 
The characteristics presented thus far indicate that most developing countries face a significant lack of 
electricity supply. At the same time, evidence suggests that where supply is available, it is often made in the 
modern urban regions with little or no supply at all in the less developed areas. The provision of an 
adequate supply network in rural areas is thus of the utmost importance. 
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2.4 THE ROLE OF ELECTRICITY AND THE BASIC NEEDS APPROACH 
The basic needs approach (BNA) to development arose from dissatisfaction with the results of past 
development efforts and was greatly influenced by the continuing absolute poverty of millions in developing 
countries. This goal was founded in the belief that as long as the poor remain deprived of the essentials 
required for an economically productive life, development would be impossible. As a result, the approach is 
viewed in many current development circles as a broadening of the concept of development in the sense 
that it aims at eliminating absolute poverty on a permanent and sustainable basis, thereby promoting the 
development of underprivileged areas and enabling even the lowest income groups to enjoy a minimum 
standard of living. 
The major strength of the BNA is that it is viewed as providing a key to the solution of a number of 
separate, but related problems. In particular, Streeten (1979, 30) and Slabbert (1984, 22) assert that the 
aspects of urbanisation, protection of the environment, equality, the relation between rural development 
and industrialisation, rural· urban migration, domination and dependence, appear in a new light once the 
meeting of basic needs becomes the central concern in economic development. Likewise, Nattrass (1980, 
58) points out that the BNA allows developing countries to attack the problems of poverty, growing 
inequality and economic dependence through the creation of jobs since the BNA is both labour intensive 
and import replacing. Of major importance is that jobs reduce the developing economies' need to rely on 
the migrant labour system. 
The BNA defInes basic needs in terms of material commodities such as primary health care, a minimum 
level of food consumption and a reasonable level of nutritional intake, a minimum level of education, access 
to safe drinking water and sanitation, basic clothing and shelter, transport and simple household goods. 
Certain non· material needs such as public participation, change in attitude, equality and self-reliance could 
also be provided for. While there is much controversy as to the exact criteria for defIning these components 
of BNA, the argument has found widespread acceptance from a large spectrum of writers (e.g. Burki 1980; 
Hicks 1980; UI Hug 1980; Stewart 1985). This consensus is ratified by success so far recorded by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) in developing countries such as Kenya, India, Sri Lanka and 
Colombia. 
An important conclusion is that in a nutshell, the BNA has a number of distinctive features which can be 
summarised as follows (Dewar and Watson 1981): 
High priority is given to satisfying the specifIc needs of the poorest people, not only in 
order to raise productivity, but as an end in itself. Put differently, the approach 
recognises the urgent need to tackle problems at the grassroots level and to decentralise 
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the planning and implementation of programmes aimed at ensuring greater satisfaction 
of the basic needs of the local people. These people should, in turn, be involved at every 
stage of the process. Specifically, the approach recognises that without schools, hospitals, 
sanitation and the like, the poor will either be less productive or migrate to towns and 
cities. The latter scenario naturally creates a huge waste of human resources. 
The reduction of absolute deprivation is stressed. This policy is laudable in that it 
indicates an awareness that conditions which condemn the poor to lifelong misery and 
frustration in the rural areas, constitutes a basic denial of human rights. 
Government control of supply management, particularly in the transitional periods, is 
regarded as fundamental. This interference is commendable since it ensures that 
increases in the incomes of the poor are not neutralised by price increases. 
The approach stresses access to and delivery of services to the poor through making 
maximum use of local resources for the production and distribution of essential goods 
and services. From the point of view of costs, mobilisation of public support and 
contribution to local employment, institutional design is called for. 
While the foregoing outline stresses that the provision of basic goods and services may enable the poor to 
compete more efficiently in the market place, it is, at the same time, essential to realise that electricity is an 
important input that determines both the quantity and quality of these goods and services. It particularly 
helps to provide the drive for better education, a flourishing employment market, improved housing, more 
time for recreation, greater security and greater personal fuifilinent, thereby improving the individual's 
quality of life and ensuring continued economic growth. This is true because there is a surprisingly wide 
range of uses of electricity in developing countries for both household and productive needs. These uses 
are, in turn, usually 'intended to serve both economic and social aims. 
While it is advocated that quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in education in developing countries may 
be minimised by, among others, building more schools, increasing participation through offering of 
incentives such as bursaries and free education, providing in-service training to teachers as well as designing 
appropriate curriculae (Burki 1980, 19; Van Wyk 1982, 149), it should also be recognised that improved 
equipment and better training facilities contribute greatly in both the quantity and quality of educational 
opportunities. The supply of electricity finds its role in education in its use for purposes such as visual aids 
and lighting for reading and studying in the evenings. Adult education classes are most conveniently held in 
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the evenings anti given the structure of rural societies, this is arguably the most crucial and neglected aspect 
of education for underdeveloped areas. The availability of electricity could also enable training in technical 
courses such as welding, carpentry and panel beating to be undertaken. 
Similarly, one of the solutions proposed for better health care is the introduction of a simple community 
based system which aims at preventive health and focusses on the needs of rural populations (Ghai et aJ. 
1980). Without the availability of hospitals, clinics, health centres, adequate staff and other amenities, such 
programmes are not possible. Electricity is required in hospitals and health centres to fulfIl their curative 
and preventive functions such as the sterilisation of drinking water and refrigeration for storing vaccines. 
Furthermore, an adequate supply of clean water for a wide variety of uses in every aspect of life such as 
agriculture, industry, recreation and household activities is seen as an essential requirement (Streeten 
1981). Electricity provides the power required for water pumping and processing machinery. While pumps 
for wells and town pipes may be operated either by hand or diesel engine, neither of these techniques is 
suitable for ensuring a significant and efficient supply of water. Electricity supply has to be taken into 
account in the processing and fabrication of materials needed in construction, domestic and agricultural 
implements, tools and clothes. 
In some urban areas, electricity consumption, though dominated by its use for cooking and heating is still 
growing through increasing ownership of appliances such as television, refrigerators, freezers, washing 
machines, electric kettles and irons. 
The availability of electricity is also a baseline for the establishment of industry, commerce or specialised 
services in rural areas. If as a result, industries do relocate, people can enter paid employment and be able 
to afford consumer goods. Although there is, in fact, little hard evidence as to the effect of electricity 
availability on migration, to the extent that people and businesses are attracted to and remain in rural areas 
because of it, migration from rural areas to cities may be stemmed or reduced. 
The main conclusion drawn from the preceding discussion is that electricity provides the means by which 
the most important basic needs can be fulfilled. This implies that in economic development, electricity 
supply and the provision of basic needs should be pursued side by side. However, the successful 
implementation of this strategy depends, among others, on the institutional structure and objectives of the 
supply authorities of electricity. These issues are addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ELECTRlCITY AS A PUBLIC UTILITY1 
This chapter is intended to provide a background to some of the theoretical welfare aspects that are 
deemed to be of crucial importance in the supply of public utility services. Most of the issues to be 
discussed have a direct bearing on the supply of electricity. Of course, no attempt will be made to provide a 
complete exposition and only those propositions relevant to the present study shall be set out. Indeed, a 
discussion and understanding of concepts such as public versus private goods, the economic characteristics 
of public utilities and the need for regulation by the state, are necessary in order to meaningfully interpret 
the contents of the later chapters. 
3.1 PUBLIC UTILITIES AND PUBLIC GOODS THEORY 
The economic nature of public utilities is frequently appreciated by considering the conventional distinction 
between three different kinds of goods and services, namely private, public and merit goods. While all three 
enter into the utility functions of consumers, there are at the same time, several differences that exist 
between them (Musgrave 1958, 13; Truu 1988,253). 
The private good is perfectly divisible in that it can be allocated to different individuals, priced and 
subsequently sold through the market system. Given a ftxed amount of such a good, increased consumption 
by one community member reduces the quantity available to other members by an equivalent amount. As a 
result of the private good's property of perfect divisibility, potential consumers can be excluded from 
consuming the good unless they are willing to pay the stipulated price to the owner. 
The outstanding property of a pure public good is that upon its production, it is equally consumed by all 
members of the community. Formally, a public good has the following characteristics: 
1. Public utilities are easily recognised. The term "public utility" is applied today in a restricted sense to 
certain specific industries such as water supply, rail transport, electricity, gas and telephone services, 
although Batson (1933, 458) argues that numerous other activities that could be claimed to be "useful" 
to the public such as the clothing and baking industries and house construction " ... are of at least as 
much public utility as electricity, tram rides and grain storage". 
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(a) The consumption of such a good is 'non-rival' i.e. one person's consumption does not 
diminish the amount available to any other person. 
(b) [t is not feasible, and sometimes not even possible, to exclude any individual from 
consuming the good once it is provided. 
An example of a public good is a street light because it is non-rival and non-excludable. It is not feasible or 
desirable to levy a charge on this public good "". either because to assess a charge on each occasion of use 
would be excessively cumbersome or because use is not voluntary or even defInable" (Dorfman 1973, 4) . 
Other exam pies of public goods are national defence, fIre services and radio transmission. 
Since it is not feasible, at a reasonable cost, to exclude any person from consuming a public good, it follows 
that no authority or fIrm is likely to fmd it profItable to supply public goods to the market. Such a fIrm or 
authority would have to rely on voluntary contributions for its revenues. Payments for private, non-public 
goods are not voluntary in so far as one must pay in order to receive the good. In the case of public goods, 
however, one receives the good whether or not payment is made. In such situations, governments undertake 
to pro>ide the good and fmance its provision through taxes. The implication of all this is that there is no 
meaningful per unit 'price' which may be levied on the individual for the consumption of public goods. This 
lack of price means a lack of an objective yardstick of value for public goods (MansfIeld 1979, 472; DeSerpa 
1985,290). 
In reality, however, most economic goods and services arc neither purely public nor purely private. In fact 
the vast majority of goods and services fall somewhere between these two extremes and thus exhibit 
properties of both 'publicness' and 'privateness'. Such goods are called merit goods. Since merit goods and 
services differ from each other in more than one respect, it is thus not really possible to rank them 
systematically according to comparative degrees of publicness or privateness. What is of major importance, 
however, is that they are all partially divisible and/or partially nonappropriable. As a result, merit goods are 
supplied partly by the market and partly through the state Budget. 
Most public utility services are merit goods in the sense that they exhibit properties of both publicness and 
privateness. A clear distinction can be made between the electric utilities in Britain, France, the USA and 
Western Germany. The fIrst two have state-owned electricity industries while the other two have a large 
proportion of privately owned suppliers. Furthermore, the consumption of most public utility services is 
liable to partial excludability and/ or rivalry. For instance, the provision of street lighting may exhibit 
properties of publicness while the consumption of electricity in the house may indicate the features of 
privateness in that potential consumers can be excluded from consuming the services unless they are willing 
to pay tbe stipulated price to tbe owner or supply authorities. 
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3.2 ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC UTITLITIES 
3.2.1 General features 
The most prominent economic characteristic of public utilities is tbat they do not experience pure or 
approximately pure competition, but commonly produce and sell their services under monopolistic or only 
nominally competitive conditions. In other words, public utilities are located in the upper part of the rivalry 
spectrum where the seller has a large measure of price control and knows it. 
H owever, features common to monopolies do not quite cover all possible characteristics of public utility 
services. A number of other distinctive attributes of public utility services can be briefly described as follows 
(Wallis 1983, 3): 
i) They are used on a continuous or repeated basis in a multip.licity of activities throughout 
the economy. This property makes them major industries of considerable interest and 
importance, particulary in countries aspiring to industrialisation. 
ii) Their services are usually not consumed directly, but are used as primary inputs in the 
direct production of other goods and services. Electricity, for instance, can be used as an 
input in the growing and subsequent processing of raw materials into foodstuffs in most 
agro-industries. 
iii) Except for the limited day-to-day storage of gas and reservoir storage of water, public 
utility services are non-storable. Indeed they must be produced at the precise moment 
they are required for use. Specifically, electricity must be consumed as it is demanded 
for use in the operation of machinery and household implements. Delays in use do not 
mean deferred consumption, but rather reduced demand at the time. Thus, since these 
public utility services are non-storable, the companies have much unused plant capacity 
when conslimer demand is not at a peak. As a result of this attribute and to ensure 
security of supply, extra plant capacity is provided for unforseeable changes in the peak 
demands at various times of the day, year or business cycle. 
iv) Public utility services cannot for practical purposes be transferred from one consumer to 
another due to the technical conditions of service distribution. Electricity, gas, water and 
telephone services are, for instance, consumed on the premises of the buyers, and the 
lines to one buyer are not readily extended to the homes and establishments of other 
buyers. Indeed, these services are almost as non-transferable as medical and dental 
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services. In addition, even where such transfers may be possible as between neighbours, 
they may be contrary to legislation. This property of non-transferability of service is one 
of the basic conditions of price discrimination in public utility services. 
v) A further property of public utility services which is unusual, but not unique, is that it is 
not possible for a consumer to use them wit bout baving first purchased suitable 
equipment or appliances. Using electricity as a specific example, the expenditure may 
consist of tbe wiring of a bouse for electric lighting, tbe purcbase of a refrigerator or 
electric stove, etc. The demand of any consumer witbout such equipment or facilities is 
zero at any price, but baving invested in the equipment, his demand is very inelastic until 
tbe equipment purcbased is fully utilised, wbereafter tbe marginal demand is zero unless 
and until otber equipment is in use. 
Tbe above list, indeed, implies that tbe economic characteristic of public utility services can be viewed from 
both a demand and a supply perspective. In particular, the view that public utility services are 
"indispensable" because of their use on a continuous basis and in many diverse ways throughout the 
economy, implies that their position in society is firmly established. As a result of this "essential" nature, the 
demand2 for public utility services becomes highly inelastic, both in regard to price and income (Troxell 
1947, 31; Wallis 1983, 3). In addition, the upward trend of consumption is not greatly affected by 
fluctuations in tbe level of economic activity. With electricity supply, for instance, a typical low price 
elasticity of demand is clearly observed in the industrial sector. 
The industrial consumer uses electricity almost entirely for lighting and mechanical power. As a result, 
electrical consumption for these purposes is quite inelastic and insensitive to tariff form or level, although 
electricity used for tbermal and chemical processes may often be very price sensitive (Clay 1961, 1012). In 
the same way, the income elasticity of demand for public utility services is generally low. Berrie (1967, 425) 
attributes tltis to tbe fact that in modern developed societies, families apparently consider utility services as 
a basic part of their lives - something akin to a subsistence quantity of food. As a consequence, consumers 
are generally unwilling to forego consumption of utility ser.;ces as incomes decline. Rather, an expenditure 
on non-essentials may be eliminated and that on other essentials cut down to finance demand for public 
utitlity services. 
2. Utility company managers have a special term which they use to describe the demand for services; 
they frequently speak of the "load" of utility service. The "load", a term that shows an engineering 
influence in public utility pricing generally means the prevailing scales of service of the day. or month 
or at times the potential purchases of the e,osting buyers. However, the notion of the load, like other 
business concepts of demand, appartenly is not treated as a function of prices, increasing as prices 
decline or decreasing as prices rise. 
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3.2.2 Decreasing costs/increasing returns to scale 
The production (supply) of public utility services is characterised by technical efficiency features that give 
rise to economies of scale over the entire output range of the market. In the standard theory of the fIrm, 
economies of scale exist when exp~sion of the scale of productive capacity of a flI11l or industry causes 
total production costs to increase less than proportionately with output.3 As a result of tills technical 
efftciency in production and distribution, public utilities tend to be classed as "natural monopolies" in the 
sense that competition witllln the industry will result in inefficiency and waste. The term "natural monopoly" 
is described in economic theory to imply that the control of a public utility service in a market is somehow 
"naturally" or inherently monopolistic so that the rivalry between unregulated companies is inevitably 
eliminat~d and one company ultimately dominates the market wlllch several companies once occupied. 
Standard economic theory provides a powerful justification for the creation of natural monopolies. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 below which portrays a situation in which the public utility experiences increasing 
returns to scale over the entire output range in the market where it operates. 
Increasing returns to scale mean that the long·run average cost curve (lAC) falls as output increases. As a 
result, the long-run marginal cost (LMC) curve lies below the lAC over the entire output range. The 
condition for profIt maximisation in a perfectly competitive market is that all fIrms set their marginal cost 
(MC) equal to the market price, Le. when market price PI or P2 in Figure 3.1 is set equal to LMC. In an 
industry where there are increasing returns to scale, this will lead to individual fums incurring long-run 
losses and closing down until eventually a natural monopoly emerges (Koutsoyiannis 1979, 547). 
On the basis of the above arguments, it would be appropriate to ascertain whether the electricity supply 
utility is in fact properly classed as a natural monopoly. The suggestion is made from time to time that the 
expression "natural monopoly" is misleading and unjustified when applied to electric utilities in view of the 
intense competition between suppliers of electricity and suppliers of various alternative sources of energy 
such as gas, fuel, oil and coal, wlllch adequately curtail the monopoly power of the electricity supplier. 
Contrary to the foregoing suggestion, it should be noted that the essential foundation of the concept of a 
natural monopoly is not so much the absence of alternatives or substitutes, but the fact that efficiency is 
increased in the absence of competition between two or more suppliers of the same product (Kahn 1971, 
49). Within any area, competition is seldom found between electricity utilities. The increase in efficiency in 
electricity supply results in lower unit costs and is a consequence of avoiding duplication of underground 
3. Koutsoyiannis (1979, 126) distinguishes between pecuniary and real economies of scale. Pecuniary 
economies are those associated with a reduction in the prices for the factors used in the production 
and distribution of the product due to bulk-buying as the size of the enterprise increases. On the other 
hand, real economies are those realised from a reduction in the physical quantity of inputs used in the 
production and distribution of the product due to technological efficiency. 
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cables, overhead lines, substations, connections, maintenance personnel and other equipment. In addition, 
the electricity supply industry has become a classic example of a decreasing cost industry in which average 
unit costs have fallen consistently as a result of technological improvements and economies of scale. 
From both these points of view, it is clear that electricity supply can certainly be regarded as a "natural 
monopoly" and in regard to competing energy sources, the question might well be asked whether it is not 
possible to achieve further economies by having a single distributing monopoly responsible for all or several 
public utility services. 
3.3 UNREGULATED PUBLIC UTILI1Y 
The issues of inefficiency and waste associated with competition within a public utility industry put forth 
above are obvious. To this end, Crew and K1eindorfer (1979, 3) contend that ' ... there are defInite cost 
savings in having only one water main in the street and similarly with the other utilities'. What this amounts 
to is that it would be prohibitively expensive to have two or more competing public utilities constructing 
alternative networks so that each consumer would have a choice of supplier. As an example, the most likely 
and signifIcant results of having two sources of electricity supply in competition may include costly effects 
on the continuity and reliability of service as well as failure to take full advantage of economies of scale in 
power generation. A single network is thus taken to imply a single seller in order to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of service. 
Notwithstanding the above contention, economic theory predicts that if such a natural monopoly is 
unregulated and profIt-maximising, the price will be raised above marginal cost and output of the service 
will be restricted below its optimal level. In welfare economics such practices are considered to provide a 
reason for a misallocation of productive resources and unemployment in the economy (Reder 1948, 47; 
Rees 1984, 3) . Figure 3.2 shows a typical unregulated public utility that maximises profIts by producing 
where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (LMC), i.e. MR = LMC at Om and pricing above 
LMC at Pm' In this instance, profIt is AP m per unit and total profits to the industry are measured by the 
rectangle AP mBC. 
However, it is not so much monopoly profIts which have been a cause for complaints against an 
unregulated monopoly; rather it is the deadweight loss which results from a divergence of price and 
marginal cost. At output Om in Figure 3.2, the social marginal benefIt Pm exceeds the social marginal cost 
at E. The monopolist produces too little. Social marginal cost and marginal benefit are equal at the output 
Oc and the efficient point for society is F. This point is ensured under competition where P = MC, but 
under monopoly, price exceeds MC and so output is lower than is socially desirable. The unregulated 
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monopoly thus creates a deadweight loss equal to the shaded area EBF. In theory, this situation implies 
that the unregulated monopoly leads to a less than Pareto optimal allocation of resources.4 
The partial equilibrium conclusion presented above may be reinforced by examining the effect of monopoly 
in a general equilibrium context. The essential elements of this equilibrium are illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
Assume for expositional purposes that the economy consists of two commodities, one of which (x) is 
supplied by a competitive industry while the other (y) is supplied by a·monopolist. Customarily the Pareto 
optimality requires resources to be allocated efficiently in production such that the marginal rates of 
technical substitution (MRTS) between inputs are equal for all commodities, i.e. MRTSx = MRTSy. In the 
same way, equilibrium in the purely competitive industry requires that P x = MCx for all producers. It 
follows that only one 
price ratio Px for the two commodities is possible, namely 
Py 
= = MRT 
Py MS. 
where marginal rate of transformation (MRT) is the slope of the transformation curve, IT. In the above 
figure, the competitive equilibrium is attained at point C. 
By contrast, the monopolist maximises profit by equating marginal revenue and marginal cost, i.e. MR 
MC. Since, in this instance, MR < P, Py must be greater than MC and therefore 
-< = MRT 
As a result, the reallocation of resources move the equilibrium to a point such as M, resulting in less y 
relative to x. At this point on the transformation curve, MRT exceeds P-x/Py because the monopoly price 
exceeds marginal cost. 
The outstanding feature to be drawn from the above discussion is that in the absence of regulation, the 
monopolist possesses the ability to exploit the situation of imperfect competition. In the real world, this 
property permits the seller to adopt special pricing policies which, in tum, depend on such factors as the 
4. The Paretian approach requires that it must not be possible to change the existing resource allocation 
in such a way that someone is made better off and no one worse off, since, if this is possible, the 
existing resource allocation must involve a 'welfare waste'. This criterion of aIlocative efficiency was 
put forward by the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto who is credited with having first proposed this 
tradition in his book "Manuel 'd Economic Politi que" (1909) and so is known as the 'Pareto criterion'. 
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price elasticity of demand for his product, the extent to which he is able to control the supply of the product 
to the market, the desire to obtain the maximum profit or income and other economic and nOD-economic 
considerations. 
3.4 REGULATED PUBLIC UTILI1Y 
The economic attributes of unregulated public utilities outlined in the previous section, provide good 
reason for the regulation of their activities by the state. The institutional arrangements for regulating these 
industries, however, differ from country to country. While public utilities in the United States are privately-
owned enterprises controlled by various utility commissions, such control has been traditionally effected 
through state ownership in countries such as Britain and South Africa. For this reason it will be assumed 
for simplicity in the remainder of this chapter that public utilities in South Africa are state-owned 
enterprises. 
In a conventional sense, there is the recognition that the evils of regulation of public utilities are far 
outweighed by the evils of leaving them unregulated. Arguing in support of this assertion, Wallis (1983, 4) 
has pointed out that an unregulated public utility may use its monopolistic power to 'exploit' its customers 
either by restricting the volume of its services or by appropriating their consumers' surplus through the 
practice of first and third degree price discrimination5 As a result of these deficiencies, the State often 
imposes output controls alongside price controls to enable these industries to achieve maximum economic 
efficiency. 
The criterion of 'efficiency' is a fundamental principle in the determination of tariff structmes and price levels, but one 
that occasionally has to be modified in the light of special circumstances. As Batson (1933, 467) contends, this principle 
of efficiency is, as far as public utilities are concerned, " ... a purely political judgemeni depending on whether the evils of 
regulation are less or more than the evils of laissez faire" . 
Economic principles must, however, be taken into account. In recognition of this view, Crew and 
Kleindorfer (1979, 122) have indicated that in the operation of regulation and public enterprises, economic 
principles have often been in the background of these activities. 
5. OeSerpa (1985, 319) defines first degree price discrimination to occur where a monopolist can charge 
different rates to each individual consumer and third degree price discrimination to OCCllI where 
different rates are charged to different classes of consumers. 
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The two fundamental economic criteria which have been applied by governments in regulating the process 
of price determination by public utilities have been, according to Wallis (1983, 6), those of "fairness" 
(equity) and "fmancial viability". The most crucial concern is that the tariff structure for public utility 
services should be "fair" in the sense that no group of consumers should be discriminated against by being 
charged more than the cost incurred in supplying them. The notion of equity is extended to include the 
provision of services to the largest possible number of consumers at the lowest possible cost, and adequate 
safeguards should be built in to protect the public from possible exploitation by monopolist suppliers. 
In addition to the above, public utilities are required to achieve and maintain financial viability. 
Formulation of fmancial objectives in terms of long-term viability and the need to cover immediate costs 
are thu,;·necessary. The programme should incorporate capital and operating expenditure forecasts, loan 
and equity fmancing, tariff formulation and the acceptable rate of return on assets. The basic objective is 
that the utility should, in the long-term, remain financially viable without the need for state subsidisation. 
The above criteria clearly point to the government's concern in making public utilities operate in a socially 
acceptable and economically efficient way. In a conventional theoretical sense, the 'effIciency' criterion is 
facilitated by getting the unregulated natural monopoly as close as possible to the socially effIcient 
allocation of resources in the economy. Figure 3.4 illustrates this scenario. 
In Figure 3.4, the economic conditions leading to natural monopoly are, as in Figure 3_2. described by the 
conventional demand and marginal revenue curves and the long-run average and marginal cost curves. In 
the absence of any regulatory activity, the monopolist would maximise profits, producing at an output rate 
of Om and charging a price of P m- The regulatory alternatives may embrace three solutions (Hirshleifer 
1980,350; Begg et al. 1984,382). 
To begin with, the regulatory authorities may impose the average cost price of P2' At this price, the 
monopoly would produce at a rate of output of 02 where price equals average cost This type of regulated 
natural monopoly reflects a reduction in the social cost of the deadweight burden from EBF to HGF. Some 
welfare losses (area HGF) are incurred but the monopolist earns a normal profit. 
Secondly, the monopolist may be ordered to produce at the socially efficient point F where price equals 
marginal cost, but a government subsidy equal to rectangle P sP3FI must be provided in order to cover the 
losses that this will inevitably imply. However, to subsidise the already regulated monopolist would create 
additional problems. In particular, the regulatory authorities will need to levy taxes elsewbere to raise the 
revenue to pay the subsidy. Such action creates welfare losses and is usually not justified on income 
distribution grounds. Furthermore, subsidies create administrative difficulties and may be politically 
infeasible and unpopular. 
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Finally the monopolist may he allowed to charge a two-part tariff. A two-part tariff is a pricing policy which 
requires users to pay a fixed sum for access to the service and then pay a price per unit which reflects the 
marginal cost of production (DeSerpa 1985, 324). 1n Figure 3.4, the authorities may instruct the monopolist 
to charge P3 for each unit of the service and then allow it to levy the minimum fixed charge necessary to 
ensure that the monopolist breaks even after allowing for all relevant economic costs. This pricing system 
is, however, not always a feasible solution because it may induce people to abandon the consumption of the 
service altogether if the fIXed charge has to be very high. 
Evidently, two problems emerge in an attempt to adopt any of the above solutions. Firstly, these measures 
presume considerable knowledge on the part of the regulating ~uthority. The authority must know the 
demand function and marginal costs, which may be difficult to uncover from the accounts of the 
monopolist. Secondly, the socially efficient point F in Figure 3.4 is a first-best solution, which can only be 
attained if there are no other distortions elsewhere in the economy.6 . 
1n response to the above problems, second-best policies may be introduced into the analysis? These 
policies require the regulatory authority to expand the output of the natural monopoly up to the point at 
which the marginal reduction in the deadweight burden equals the marginal increase in the deadweight 
burden elsewhere as a result of extra distortionary taxes (Begg et al. 1984, 383). To this end, the authority 
may generally wish to regulate natural monopolites so that they produce at an output a little lower than 03 
at prices between marginal cost and average cost. By pricing above marginal cost, losses are partly reduced 
and there is, as a result, less need for distortionary taxation elsewhere. 
The above suggestion may be illustrated in a general equilibrium framework in Figure 3.5. 1n the 
exposition, an economy is assumed to consist of two commodities, one of which (x) is supplied by a 
competitive industry and the other (y) by an unregulated natural monopoly i.e. point M in Figure 3.5. 
Introducing second-best policies (and lump sum taxes if these seem justified on income distribution 
grounds) to enforce marginal cost pricing might take one to point C.8 However, negative supply side effects 
resulting from higher taxes required for subsidisation are more likely to move the economy to point S. This 
point indicates that resources are not being used fully or efficienctly since it is possible to have more of both 
6. The first-best allocation is attainable only within what is termed a 'first-best' economy. 1n the first-best 
economy, all markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive (Rees 1984). 
7. The second-best optimum refers to the Pareto optimum which can be achieved in the presence of 
constraints (Tisdell 1972, 299). 
8. A suggestion has been made by Hotelling (1938) that this marginal cost pricing would be optimal even 
where a natural monopoly incurs continual losses if these losses were financed by raising lump sum 
taxes. It is, however, generally accepted that there are no feasible taxes which are of a truly lump sum 
character. Any feasible tax is thus likely to distort the Pareto optimum. This is, for example, 
particularly true of indirect taxes. 
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commodities by being on the transformation curve IT. Nevertheless it is possible that welfare may be 
higher at point S than at point M, where the latter reflects the unregulated natural monopoly equilibrium. 
3,5 COSTS OF REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Government intervention to control the activities of 'natural monopolies' such as electricity utilities or other 
public utilities as outlined above represents the standard point of departure for discussion of regulation in 
the textbook literature. From the point of view of the economist, such regulation entails no more than 
introducing taxes, subsidies or other policies to neutralise various monopoly distortions that would 
otherwise exist. In many respects, this broad approach has provided the rationale for the extension of 
government in an attempt to improve upon the allocation of resources attained in unregulated markets, 
particularly in mixed economies during the post-war era. 
Contrary to the above scenario, recent developments in economic science and elsewhere have revealed a 
growing scepticism as regards both the usefulness and effectiveness of state intervention in unregulated 
markets. In particular, public choice theorists such as Posner (1975), Bohm (1973), Tullock (1978), 
Buchanan (1978), Stigler and Friedland (1982) and Peacock (1984) have increasingly come to acknowledge 
that the myriad of regulatory activities characteristic of modern government may severely undermine 
economic efficiency and distort the equity outcomes of market activity. On the basis of these deficiencies, 
the growth of state intervention is thus viewed as constituting a departure from the essentially normative 
purpose of welfare economics. 
Apart from the various costs associated with marginal cost pricing outlined in the previous section, there 
are several other factors that can be attributed to the perceived inability of state regulation to secure 
optimal outcomes. The following two appear to be pertinent to the regulation of public utilities. 
In the first place, state regulation may provide the regulatory authority with a strong incentive to engage in 
activities that may result in an excess supply of the public utility service. The basic argument in this context 
is that regulation may induce authorities to indulge in empire building, discrimination against unpopular 
demographic groups, and acts of giving favours to friends and relatives. Customarily, these activities might, 
to a certain extent, be intended to generate favourable public notice. As a result, the welfare loss emanating 
from these activities may be large. Assuming constant costs for expositional purposes, the issue of 
oversupply may be illustrated as in Figure 3.6. 
Under constant costs conditions, conventional regulatory measures will cause the price of the service to 
drop from P u to P r1 and the output of the service to increase from OOu to 00r1' However, due to the 
vigorous pursuit of favourable public notice by regulatory authorities, public utilities might be instructed to 
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produce at QrZ and charge a lower price PrZ' lf indeed QrZ is actually produced at Prz' the (additional) 
cost is Pr1ABPr2 which exceeds the increase in consumer surplus PrlEBPrZ by the shaded triangle EAB. 
This triangle reflects the additional net cost of oversupply due to state regulation. 
Secondly, even if an optimal level of public utility service provision could be attained, another cost is likely 
to arise from government regulation. Introduced into the economies literature by Leibenstein (1966, 395) as 
X-inefficiency, this notion suggests that industries producing in the absence of strong competitive pressures 
may lack sufficient incentive to maintain full internal efficiency and instead may allow their unit costs to rise 
perhaps substantially above the level that would be obtained under competitive conditions. An outstanding 
example in this regard is that of regulating public utilities through nationalisation (i.e. taking over the entire 
running of the industry so that all operations can be carefully monitored), such as in the case of rail 
transport in South Africa. This type of regulation may result in organisational or "intellectual" slack 
(Curwen 1979, 132), which can arise from a lack of knowledge regarding the optimnm combinations of 
factor inputs as well as an inclination on the part labourers at all levels in the hierarchy to work at less than 
their full capacity. The effects of X-inefficiency are illustrated in Figure 3.7 below where it is again assumed 
for simplicity that costs are constant. 
In Figure 3.7 Pu, Qu and Prl, Qrl reflect unregulated and regulated prices and output levels, respectively. 
Now due to the perceived organisational slack in the nationalised utility, costs may rise from MCI = ACI 
to MCZ = ACZ thereby resulting in a drop in output from OQrl to OQr2' The increase in costs also results 
in a deadweight gain from regulation, ABC, which is smaller than the previous gain of AFE. 
On the basis of the above comments, some radical suggestions have been made by several public choice 
theorists. In particular, Demsetz (1968,56) argues that public utilities should not be regulated at all. To this 
end, he suggests tbat a competitive bidding process conducted at suitable intervals should instead take the 
place of regulation. In his opinion, the winner of this bidding process may then be franchised to operate a 
monopoly at the "bid" price over the agreed time interval until the next competitive bid. Clearly, however, 
and as Crew and Kleindorfer (1979, 127) have pointed out, for public utitlities like electricity with highly 
expensive and immobile capital, such a scheme is impractical. 
In essence, the criticism levelled thus far against corrective state intervention does not imply either that a 
public utility service should not be provided at all or that it should not be provided publicly. As Dollery and 
Wallis (1987, 4) have pointed out, " ... any normative evaluation of state intervention must weigh potential 
welfare gains from correcting market failure against the welfare losses attendant upon intervention itself." It 
follows that when the welfare loss due to state intervention is less than the welfare loss due to leaving public 
utitlities unregulated, corrective state intervention would be justified. In the supply of public utitlity services 
for instance, without state intervention to control the activities of these industries, destructive competition 
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with resultant unnecessary duplication of services may arise, thereby contributing to inefficiencies and great 
welfare losses. On this basis an argument is presented by Hen·mann (1974, 3-19) concerning the supply of 
electricity. In his opinion, there are various factors that justify corrective state intervention in the supply of 
electricity services. These are briefly set out below: 
i) Electricity is today an essential element in the whole of our social and economic system with a 
powerful influence on social amenities, educational opportunities, transport and the cost of most 
items in daily use. As a result it is undesirable that the decision as to who should or should not 
receive electrical service and at what price should be left entirely to a rate engineer or Town Clerk 
without some disinterested form of control. 
ii) The structure of costs and tariffs in the electricity supply industry is of such complexity that the 
man in the street would be unable to present an effective .argument in the event of a legitimate 
complaint and is therefore in need of some body to whom he can appeal and that will look after his 
interests. 
iii) As long as the utility's profit limitation is related to its total revenue, there must be some means of 
protecting those consumer groups with relatively inelastic demands from discrimination in favour 
of those with more elastic demands. 
In conclusion, it is largely on the grounds of the above arguments that regulation of electricity supply 
activities, particularly tariffs, is not only desirabl~ but may also be viewed as one of the most effective 
methods of averting social welfare losses. However, Herrmann (1974, 3-20) cautions that the regulating 
body must be fully aware of its responsibilities and of the principles on which such regulation should be 
based in order to avoid the danger of creating welfare losses that are economically and socially undesirable. 
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PART TWO: PRINCIPLES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
An outline of the main objectives of the present study was presented in Chapter 1. It was pointed out there 
that an attempt will be made along lines suggested by the framework of cost-benefit analysis to identify 
relevant private and external benefits and costs of electrification. Toward this end, a general account of 
theoretical issues within the broad area of the theory of CBA will be given in the following chapter. We shall 
focus on the major CBA concepts that seem to bear relevance to the purpose of the study, particularly those 
that could be utilised when evaluating tbe role of electricity supply in a developing region like Venda. 
Essentially it is hoped that some of the sections in these cbapters will provide a direct linkage witb the nature 
of benefits and costs of electrification that will be outlined in Part Three. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE STATE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 
4.1 THE ORIGINS OF CBA 
Although the subject of CBA has come into prominence among e~nomists only in recent years, it has been 
arounch long time, according to Prest and Turvey (1%5, 681). Its inception formally appeared in 1844 with 
the publication of an essay: "On the measurement of the utility of Public Works' by Jules Dupuit, a 
nineteenth-century French engineer. l Dupuit developed the concepl of consumers' surplus, and proposed 
that the benefits to the community of public enterprises like bridges and roads are not the revenues 
received by the public treasury or the actual payments made by the public, but the public's willingness to 
pay, i.e. the sum of actual payments and consumers' surplus. Dupuit's idea is today· ... a cornerstone of 
CBA, particularly in the analysis of, among other things, road investments' (little and Mrrrlees 1974, 28). 
However, Dupuit's ideas lay dormant until the passage of the US Flood Control Act of 1936 which 
prescribed that flood control projects should pass the test that 'the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue 
are in excess ofthe estimated costs'. Unfortunately, this legal requirement gave no specific guidance on how 
to defIne benefits and costs. In evaluating this shortcoming, Eckstein (1971, 48) pointed out that 
"( al)though the Act has moulded the development of CBA, measuring all benefits and 
costs to 'whomsoever they may accrue' is not only beyond the present ability of economic 
science, but presents conceptual diffIculties which by their very nature can never be 
overcome except by making very specific assumptions on matters about which the Act 
does not prescribe". 
Despite this deficiency, the Act actually stimulated work in both the theory and application of CBA, first 
only in the area of water resources, but by the 1950s in defence analysis and since the 1960s in virtually all 
areas of public expenditure. Other examples of early use of a rudimentary form of CBA are found in the 
programme budgeting systems of the Tennessee Valley Authority and US Department of Agriculture 
(Gramlich 1981, 7; Steiner 1974, 331). 
1. Translated in International Economic Papers 2 (1952, 83-100). English translation by Barback R.H. 
from "De la Mesure del'utilite des Travaux Publics", Annales des Ponts et Chaussees, 2d series vol. 8 
1844. Reprinted by courtesy of International Economic papers in Readings in Welfare Economics 
edited by Arrow KJ. and Scitovsky T. (1969). London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. pp. 235-283. 
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Today, cost-benefit analyses are routinely conducted throughout both developed and developing countries 
in irrigation, hydro-electricity and transport investments, to mention but a few. In the field of electricity 
supply, it is no accident that the most interesting contemporary ideas on the subject of CBA should be 
those put forward in the late 1950s and early 1960s by economists in countries like France, USSR, Britain 
and Scotland. This part of the process is, according to Meek (1%3, 38), symbolised by events such as the 
establishment of electricity authorities, for example the Electricite de France and the Central Electricity 
Generating Board in Britain. More recently, Turvey and Anderson (1977) have made an important 
contribution by their detailed analysis of CBA to electricity supply. 
4.2 THE CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVES OF CBA . 
Cost -benefit analysis is generally considered to be an economic technique or a practical method used to 
' ... assess the desirability of projects where it is important to·take a long view (in the sense 
of looking at repercussions in the further as well as the nearer future) and a wide view (in 
the sense of allowing for side effects of many kinds on many persons, industries, regions, 
etc.) i.e. it implies the enumeration and evaluation of all the relevant costs and benefits" 
(Prest and Turvey 1%5, 681). 
Stated simply and clearly, this planning technique has a specific meaning in economics in that it attempts to 
set out and evaluate the costs and benefits of investment projects and may be used in deciding whether or 
not the projects should be undertaken. Numerous authorities, both in industry and government circles, have 
found it to be an excellent tool for the evaluation of alternative projects or programmes, their ultimate 
purpose being the selection of the one which would be the most suitable.2 Some examples of public projects 
which may be suited to CBA are the building of a motorway, the construction of a new reservoir and 
building a nuclear-powered electricity generating station. In addition, social programmes of a wide ranging 
nature can be reviewed with the aid of this technique. 
2. Since the pUblication of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development manual in 
1968 (Little and Mirrlees) the idea has become accepted that CBA should be used to appraise projects 
in both developed and developing countries (Bohm 1973; Brown and Jackson 1978; Tisdell 1985; De 
Wet 1975). 
A project is defined in this context to imply" ... an undertaking whose benefits and costs are 
identifiable, and whose feasibility can be determined in technical terms" Sewell et al. (1%1, 5). In the 
same way, Eckstein (1958, 51) defines a program as a set of projects, usually in one general area. In 
other words, a program of development may contain one or more projects with each of the component 
projects being separately analysed. 
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The essential difference between CBA and ordinary investment appraisal metbods used by firms is tbe 
emphasis placed on the social costs and benefits in CBA. As Sewell et al. (1961, 1) have clearly pointed out, 
tbe majority of these ordinary investment appraisal methods used by ftrms have suffered from a common 
fault: they have been too limited in scope and as a result have failed to provide a sufficient framework upon 
which the various benefits and costs involved could be set out in tbeir true perspective. In particular, 
methods such as cash-flow analysis and private profttability analysis look, according to Pearce and Nash 
(1981, 1) only at the interests of producers. 
Contrary to the above, tbe aim of CBA is to identify and measure the losses and gains in economic welfare 
which are incurred by society as a whole if the particular project in question is undertaken. This is the sense 
in which Little and Mirrlees (1968), Pearce (1983), Mishan (1971), De Wet (1976) and otber writers use tbe 
term. In principle, CBA is thus used " ... to ensure that searce resources are allocated efficiently, ftrst 
between competing private sectors and public uses and second, between alternative public sector projects" 
(Brown and Jackson 1978, 158). 
Alongside the development and growth in the use of CBA has been growth in botb general and specific 
criticisms of the technique and it is against this background tbat the more cautious modern approaches to 
tbe use of CBA are best understood. According to Hosking (1983, 4), the initial focal point of tbe criticism 
was theoretical in so far as positive economics came to be replaced by normative economics, and at the 
same time normative economics had itself come under tbe most severe criticism. In addition to tbe 
tbeoretical aspects, a general criticism has been that CBA attempts to reduce everything to the common 
denominator of money and tbat this is simply not possible. Another such criticism is tbat CBA lacks 
objectivity because it is biased by the subjective attitudes of those performing the study. This criticism 
revolves around effects allegedly erroneously included or excluded as benefits or costs as well as their 
valuation (Rady 1977, 68). Such deftciencies are generally seen as making CBA " ... an ambiguous 
instrument in social decision-making" (De Wet 1976, 51). 
Even the proponents of CBA admit that some of these criticisms are justified, and it appears tbat a more 
cautious approach to the use of CBA dominates recent economic theory.3 In most of their writings, the 
proponents of CBA point to the continued evolution of CBA. More precisely, they contend tbat over time 
researchers and practitioners have worked to eliminate the glaring deficiencies of CBA. For example, while 
in earlier years the only project effects included in CB studies were those affecting gross national product,4 
3. Prominent proponents in this sphere are Tisdell (1985); Dasgupta, Sen and Marglin (1972); Mishan 
(1976) and Grut (1976). 
4. This point was first raised by Maass (1966, 208) who contends that a major limitation of CBA is its 
ranking of projects and programme in terms of economic efficiency which " ... at the national level ... 
means that projects and programs are judged by the amount that they increase the national product". 
In his opinion, tbe objective functions of most government programs are complex, embracing 
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today many studies attempt to incorporate environmental and social factors, regional implications and 
distributional consequences as well. Perhaps the real justification advanced by proponents is summed up by 
their insistence that 
' ... criticisms of cost-benefit analysis are only admissible if they can demonstrate that 
alternative prescriptive procedures are in some way superior ... (and) to this end there 
must be criteria of superiority' (Dasgupta and Pearce 1972, 16). 
Despite these problems with the CBA technique, CBA would seem to provide a better framework for the 
evaluation of projects and programmes of resource development than would any other technique (Pearce 
1983). To this end it may be considered a useful aid to decision-making. 
In the· light of the above considerations, it is apparent that the CBA technique incorporates several costs 
and benefits. The next section will therefore be devoted to the identification of those costs and benefits that 
need to be included in the analysis. 
4.3 IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Once a project has been clearly dermed, the next major problem in performing a CBA is to properly 
identify costs and benefits. This .classification, called the 'real base of CBA' by De Wet (1976, 53), derives 
from the well-established aim of the technique of CBA that ill! relevant costs and benefits (direct and 
indirect) associated with an economic action should be included in the analysis. 
The most conventional distinction between types of costs and benefits in CBA is that made between private 
and external (spillover or neighbourhood) effects. This differentiation was made famous by Pigou (1950, 
183) who, in the course of his treatise on welfare economics, pointed out that there may be circumstances in 
which the market price of a good or service does not reflect the external costs or benefits involved in its 
production or consumption, To this end, he defines private effects as those which directly or indirectly 
affect the decisions of its performers. On the other hand, external effects exist when the actions of one party 
harm or benefit another party without any compensation or monetary reward changing hands in the 
process. The parties may be either consumers or producers, while one or more activity may be involved. 
If the recipient party is a consumer, for example, the externality may be represented as an additional 
variable in his utility function (Buchanan and Stubblebine 1%2, 372); that is, 
important objectives such as the redistribution of income to classes or to regions, the promotion of 
national self-sufficiency, etc. 
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4.1. 
where q 1. Q2, ... , 'In in equation 4.1 represent activities that are exclusively under the control of party A, "b 
is an activity controlled by party B, and f ("b) ~ 0 depending on whether it represents a positive or 
negative externality. A similar formulation can be made for the production function of an individual firm. 
External effects may be classified as either technological or pecuniary. Technological external effects entail 
changes in the real consumption or production possibilities of recipient parties and can manifest themselves 
in many possible ways. A "producer-producer" externality may be dermed as one in which the scale of 
operation in one production unit affects the output of other units, given that there is no change in their 
inputs of capital, labour or other factors of production. A new dam constructed upstream to an existing 
electrical plant may, for example, stabilise the flow of water and increase the downstream capacity to 
generate electricity. Likewise, a producer-consumer externality occurs when the installation of street 
lighting reduces the incidence of violent crime or when the smoke emitted by an electric power station 
causes certain respiratory illnesses amongst residents in the surrounding area. 
Consumer-consumer externalities may also be fairly common. An individual homeowner who overloads his 
own supply connection may cause voltage depressions elsewhere and expose his neighbours to a serious risk 
of fire, electric shocks, radio interferences and damage to electrical appliances. Consumer-producer effects 
are typified by vandals who damage electrical substations, transformers and transmission lines. In all these 
cases, a negative technological externality either reduces utility or decreases productivity, depending, of 
course on whether it affects a consumer or a producer while a positive externality has the opposite effect. 
Pecuniarv externalities may also be relevant in a developing region characterised by large inequalities and 
widespread unemployment and underemployment (Prest and Turvey 1965; Hirschman 1967). These effects 
are brought about by an alteration in the demand and supply conditions facing the recipient parties and are 
reflected in changes in the prices of inputs and outputs (Sassone and Schaffer 1978,38). The construction of 
a new electrical power station may raise the demand for electrical appliances and boost the profits of 
retailers, wholesalers and producers of such appliances, thus ultimately leading to increased investment and 
the creation of new job opportunities. 
Formally technological external costs and benefits should always be accounted for in a CBA because they 
are real and they increase or decrease social welfare. On the other hand, most writers on CBA suggest that 
pecuniary effects should be excluded because they usually represent a redistribution of income from one 
group in society to another and therefore do not influence the total welfare of society (Louw 1981, 122). 
Despite tbis general assertion, Margolis (1957, 284) and Georgi (1973, 20) have pointed out that pecuniary 
effects can, at a general level, be significant for most capital investments in the economy, particularly in 
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infrastructural investments in less developed countries where resources are underuti1ized. Essentially it 
should be appreciated that infrastrnctural projects playa crucial role in developing underdeveloped regions. 
As a result, it would appear that pecuniary external effects should be included in CBA when it is applied in 
an underdeveloped region. As a part of infrastructure in such underdeveloped regions, electrification may 
"induce" pecuniary effects such as the creation of job opportunities for local people and the alleviation of 
slum conditions. Health improvement through the avoidance of exposure to poisonous gases may also be 
included in the list of pecuniary effects that could be induced by electrification of a region. 
It should not be concluded from this discussion that it is, in practice, easy to distinguish clearly between 
technological and pecuniary effects. These remote effects are, as Henderson (1%5, 88) has stressed, 
difficult to identify in a comprehensive CBA. By way of example, while the economies of scale which are 
realised in other industries may represent a technological externality, it is also brought about through a 
change in demand and is therefore also a pecuniary externality. As <! result, a great deal of the art of CBA 
lies in being able to make appropriate judgements on this question of identifying technological and 
pecuniary external effects. In addition, external effects can be quite widespread (prest and Turvey's "wide 
view") and therefore can easily be 'missed' by the CB analyst. 
4.4 VALUATION AND SHADOW PRICING 
Having identified the relevant costs and benefits to be included in CBA as presented in the preceding 
chapter, the next problem is to consider how these costs and benefits can be valued. In this section attention 
is focussed on procedures that are used in the valuation o~ costs and benefits. 
4.4.1 The use of consumer (producer) surplus and willingness to pay (WfP) in 
measuring private costs and benefits 
Simply stated, consumer surplus5 represents the excess of the amount a consumer is prepared to pay for a 
good or service (rather than go without it) over the amount he actually pays for it. On the other hand, a 
producer surplus represents the excess of the total earnings (revenue) of a supplier of a good or service 
over the payment he would require just to induce him to continue to supply the amount he currently does 
supply. Theoretically, the existence of the consumer and producer surplusses can be depicted as in Figure 
4.1 below. 
5. The term 'consumer surplus' and a rigorous analysis of the concept was first put forward by Marshall 
(1930) in the Principles of Economics, although the French engineer Jules Dupuit (1844) first 
developed the idea in his analysis of the pricing of public services. A historical perspective on this 
notion is also given in Currie~. (1971). 
Price 
Cost 
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Figure 4.1: ILLUSTRATION OF CONSUMER AND PRODUCER SURPLUSES. 
Output 
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In Figure 4.1, it is assumed for expositional purposes that an expanSIOn of an eXIStIng project (e.g. 
electricity) has the effect of causing a shift in the supply curve to the right from MC1 to MC2.0 thereby 
leading to the lowering of price from P1 to P2 and an increase in production from 01 to 02' The total 
benefits to consumers arising from this change, computed as the WTP for increased output, must be equal 
to D002C, that is, the amount they actually pay (OO~P21 plus the total of the difference between what 
they are willing to pay (indicated by the demand curve) and what they aetually pay, the triangle P2DC. The 
total WTP when the price was at P1 was 001AD, so that the change in WTP is now 01 ~Ca. Of this total, 
the portion 0102CE is made up of extra costs such that the net WTP (benefits minus costs) is given by the 
shaded triangle ECA. The latter difference is conventionally defined to include both consumer surplus 
(triangle BCA) and producer surplus (triangle BCE). 
These effects reflect a situation when the industry is under perfect competition. A different conclusion will, 
however, apply in the case of most other markets since marginal co~t pricing always generates the highest 
net WTP, i.e. higher than average cost pricing or the monopoly price (Dasgupta and Pearce 1972, 104). 
Electricity supply provides a particularly interesting application of this type of analysis in that it can be 
characterised as a natural monopoly. In this case the !!tl WTP can be depicted as in Figure 4.2 below. 
In Figure 4.2 the total WTP is AOOB, total cost is EOOB and net WTP is given by triangle AEB. 
Generally speaking this net WTP would have to be compared with the net WTP associated with alternative 
public projects before a decision can be reached as to which project should be chosen. On the other hand, 
when consideration is given to the question of how an existing service can be expanded under the above 
conditions of a natural monopoly, two solutions emerge. 
The first possibility is to encourage greater capacity utilisation by means of marginal cost pricing via a 
subsidy as in Figure 4.3 below. F1gll1"e 4.3 shows an expansion of the service from 00 to OR via a subsidy 
(indicated by area HP sFG). In the analysis, the total WTP is given by area AORF, total cost (including the 
subsidy) is HORG and the difference is, as before, the net WTP. The latter difference is by inspection seen 
to exceed area AEB. Ideally this increase in net WTP must, however, be larger than that associated with the 
best alternative before a decision can be reached to expand the service. 
An alternative solution to expand the service of a natural monopoly may take the form of increased 
investment (or the creation of greater capacity). This decision would of course shift the cost curves (in 
Figures 4.2 and 43) downwards, thus leading to a greater net WTP than before. 
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Figure 4.2: NET WTP IN THE CASE OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY. 
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Figure 4.3: NET WTP WHEN SERViCE is EXPANDED. 
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4.4.2 Shadow prices 
In CBA it is often suggested that the ideal set of prices used to value various benefits and costs should be 
Pareto-efficient based upon the perfectly competitive model6 
Thus, if it is believed that market or actual prices are Pareto-efficient, then they should be used to compute 
the value of benefits and costs of a project. On .the other hand, if market prices are not Pareto-efficient or if 
they are non-existent as is the case for a large portion of public sector output, then shadow prices should be 
computed from the market price information in such a way that a better index for the promotion of 
efficiency is achieved? The latter is the normal case because of the prevalence of widespread market 
failures and imperfections or distortions in the economy such as excessively high tariff barriers, politically 
inflated wages, monopoly profits, taxes, import duties and subsidies. In particular, the profit motive may 
predominate in the private sector thereby inducing monopolistic industries that are producing under 
conditions of economies of scale to set their prices above marginal cost. Furthermore, tariffs and taxes are 
often set for reasons other than to correct for market imperfections. They could, for instance, have been set 
alternatively as a means of raising revenue, to redistribute income or as an historical or institutional 
accident (Pearce and Nash 1981, 110). As a consequence of the above distortions, market prices normally 
would need to be adjusted before they are used in CBA calculations. 
The technical literature on the derivation of shadow prices is voluminous and filled with disagreements.8 As 
this thesis will only do formal calculations for orivate costs and benefits, in which prevailing prices are 
conventionally used, this technical literature will not be discussed any further. 
4.4.3 The use of surveys in the case of external effects 
There are essentially two situations in which market prices fail to exist. These are where externalities are 
present and in the case of public goods (Demsetz 1964; Thompson 1980; Coase 1960). In CBA, the analyst 
can value public goods and externalities in a number of ways, none of which is, according to Sassone and 
Schaffer (1978, 89), satisfactory. A common approach to this problem is to obtain information by means of 
questionnaires and from these determine relative prices for such goods (Prest and Turvey 1965, 697). 
6. Prominent in this regard are economic writers such as Bohm (1973, 92); Brown and Jackson (1987, 
164); Louw (1982,124); Sugden and Williams (1978, 99); De Wet (1975, 54) and Tisdell (1985, 23). 
7. A shadow price is defmed by Barmock et a!. (1978, 406) as a price which is imputed as a true marginal 
value of a good and semce or opportunity cost of a resource and which may differ from the market 
pnce. 
8. Three references which ably demonstrate this are Little and Mirrlees (1974); Scott (1974) and Balassa 
(1974). 
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In the case of calculating the benefits of the project, a questionnaire should seek to elicit the consumers' 
willingness to pay for the benefit, and where the costs of the project are being measured, the objective 
should be to ascertain how much compensation the consumer would require in order to make him 
indifferent to the costs of the project as they affect him. The main problem associated with using 
questionnaires is that of the free-rider (a person who claims that he derives no benefit and thus leave it up 
to other individuals to make sure that the good is provided and duly paid for). An additional problem is that 
each person who opposes the electrification of a village or r~gion may be motivated to exaggerate the costs 
of electrification, whereas each person who favours it may be motivated to understate these costs. 
In view of the deficiency of using questionnaires as pointed out ab?ve, it is suggested by Sewell et al. (1961, 
19) that·in a CBA technique, only a qualitative description of the impact of public goods and externalities 
should be made when all other quantitative methods have failed. 
4.5 TIME, DISCOUNTING AND INVESTMENT CRITERIA 
All benefit-cost calculations involve the discounting of flows of income over time. For example, if one 
denotes the benefits received (the analysis is also applicable to costs) in any future year by Bt, where t 
refers to the year and if the project lasts for n years, then the present value of the benefits of the project is 
, 
given by the sum of all annual benefits, each discounted to convert this annual total into present-value 
terms: 
Net present value of 
= + + + • • • + 
project benefits (NPV) 1 + r1 (1 + r1) (1 +rz) 
4.2 
Using a more condensed notation and assuming for simpliCity that the discount rate, r,is constant over all 
future periods, the st?Udard equation for the NPV of a project becomes 
n Bt NPV = 1: (1 + r)t t = 0 
4.3 
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where n is the life of the project, Bt is the expected net benefits from the investment, and (I + d is the 
factor by which each net benefit (benefits minus costs) is discounted. 
The calculation of discounted present values is facilitated by the availability of discount tables showing the 
value of 
I 
(1 + d 
i.e. the discount factor for any value of r and t. 
4.5.1 Choice of the discount rate 
The choice of a suitable discount rate with which future costs and benefits are to be discounted is one of the 
most important problems in the evaluation of investment projects. Two reasons are advanced for this 
importance. In the first place, if too Iowa discount rate is chosen, then socially inefficient projects will be 
undertaken. However, if too bigh a discount rate is chosen, then efficient projects may fail to clear the hurdle 
of acceptability . In the second instance, it is noteworthy that what is at stake when choosing a discount rate is 
not onJy the acceptance or rejection of specific projects, but also the allocation of resources between the 
public and the private sectors of the economy. 
In traditional capital theory, a single discount rate equates the marginal rate of time preference (or ~RTP) of 
savers with the marginal productivity of capital in investment. 9 However, CBA analysts have recently begun 
to recognise that in a mixed economy with market imperfections. no single discount rate can be taken as a 
measure of both time preference and the productivity of capital. In the face of these deficiencies, two types of 
discount rates have been advocated, namely the social opportunity cost of capital (SOCC) and the social rate 
of time preference (SRTP). 10 
The SOCC is a measure of the value to society of the next best alternative use to which the resources (funds) 
employed in the public project might otherwise have been put. In other words, it is the value to society of 
whatever it is that the project precludes (Henderson 1968). In a perfectly competitive world, the opportunity 
9. The marginal Tate of time preference or MRTP is defmed as an individual's marginal rate of substitution 
between present and future consumption. On the other hand, the marginal productivity of capital is 
defmed as the rate of transformation of investment opportunity, i.e. the marginal rate of transforming 
present for future consumption in production (Eckstein 1957; Feldstein 1964; Marglin 1963). 
10. A detailed mathematical derivation of these two alternative approaches to the selection of a suitable 
discount rate is given by Pearce and Nash (1981, 145) and Pearce (1983,40). 
55 
cost of these resources could be represented by the market interest rate. On the other hand, the SRTP assigns 
current values to future consumption. thereby reflecting society's evaluation of the relative desirability of 
consumption at different points in time. A social time preference function will reflect social ethics and 
judgements about future economic conditions and need not take the form of a constant discount rate. 
In practice, the SOCC and SRTP are bound to diverge. This is because financial markets are not characterised 
by a single interest rate, but rather by several different rates. Other reasons that are advanced for the 
inequality of SOCC and SRTP include differences in risk, inadequate capital markets and the existence of 
externalities as well as the effects of direct taxation. As an example, it has to be noted that government 
projects tend to be riskless, not because they are individually subject to less risk than private-sector projects 
(often the reverse is the case), but because the sheer size of the public sector means that the risk per project is 
small because of the ability to 'pool' risks across many projects or across the many people who make up 
society. If risk in the private sector is positive, then the value of SOCC will be increased to reflect the 'risk 
premium'. In this way SOCC will diverge even further from SRTP (Bohm 1973, 110; Pearce 1983, 45). In 
view of this divergenc,:, Brown and Jackson (1978, 171) have suggested that a reasonable way of proceeding 
is for a CB analyst to calculate a shadow price for the social opportunity cost of funds used in public sector 
investment and to include this in the discount rate calculation. 
4.5.2 Investment criteria in the public sector 
Once the costs and benefits of an investment project in a CBA technique have been measured and discounted 
at an appropriate rate of interest, what follows is a means of summarising the infonnation so that the costs 
and benefits of alternative investments can be compared. There are three basic ways of prosenting this 
information: (1) by means of a calculation of the net present value (NPV) of the investment, ·(2) by means of 
a benefit-cost ratio and (3) by calculating the internal rate of return (IRR) of the investment. 
However since the NPV and the benefit-cost ratio are, according to Gittinger (1982), very straightforward to 
apply and are also the most commonly used methods in CBA, the IRR will not be discussed in this study. 
The NPV criterion states that investments benefit the economy when the difference between discounted 
benefits and costs is positive. Mathematically, this would imply accepting the project if the NPV is greater 
than zero i.e. when 
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n 
NPV E o 4.4 
t = 0 
which is analogous to the discounting equation presented in equation 4.3 except that the annnal costs of the 
investment are subtracted in the numerator to· give the present value of the net benefits of the project.11 
When there is more than one mutually exclusive project to choose from, the projects are ranked in terms of 
the present values of their net benefits and that project with the largest NPV is chosen provided, of course, 
that its NPV is positive. The principal problem associated with using the NPV method is, however, the 
determination of the appropriate discount rate. 
The benefit-cost ratio advocates the maximisation of the benefit-cost ratio i.e. it shows the relation between 
the present value of the realised benefits and the present value of the realised costs by means of the 
formula 
B 
C 
n 
! 
t = 0 
Byn 
t 1: (1 + r) t ,;, 0 
4.5 
The decision rule regarding project investment is that projects are beneficial when their benefit-cost ratio is 
greater than 1 (criterion of exclusion). Furthermore, the projects with the highest ratio are preferred. Like 
the NPV method, the main disadvantage of the benefit-cost ratio is that of choosing an appropriate 
discount rate. 
4.6 DISTRIBUTION, UNCERTAINTY AND RISK12 
In any conventional CBA of public projects, there is a frequent need to consider the distributional impact of 
a project and to allow for risk and uncertainty. 
11. In infrastructure investments, e.g. electricity supply, Georgi (1973, 15) has asserted that it is practical 
to assume that C contains only costs which are directly related to the project, e.g. repair, capital and 
maintenance costs. 
12. Since these distribution and risk uncertainty issues are not considered in this study, a discussion on 
their major properties will not be attempted in this section. 
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In assessing the distributional impact, two schools of thought are identifiable in most of the literature on 
CBA, namely the cardinal and ordinal approaches.13 Both, however, arrive at the same conclusion: that 
unless some prior value judgements are made about the distributional impact of the project, very little can 
be said without considerable qualification about alternative economic situations. 
As far as the question of risk and uncertainty is concerned, it is asserted by most observers that the future 
stream of benefits and costs, particularly for projects with effects far into the future such as the supply of 
electricity, is not known with complete certainty. In fact not even effects in the immediate future, that is the 
investment costs of projects, can always be known with certainty. As a result several approaches are 
employed in most CBA calculations to allow for risk and uncertainty.14 
4.7 OTHER CONSTRAINING CONSIDERATIONS IN CBA 
Investment decisions in CBA are always subject to a number of diverse constraints that should be satisfied 
before a project can be chosen. Such constraints may be usefully classified into a number of categories 
(Henderson 1965, 144): 
To begin with, physical constraints restrict choices to what is technically feasible. For example, in the case 
of a hydropower project, the topography often limits the range of choice. In some cases, legal rights may 
prohibit some developments. Administrative constraints may prevent the selection of certain courses of 
action which involve excessive complexity or too drastic a change in existing practice. Political constraints 
may affect the freedom of choice of governments. For example, if benefits and costs of the project are not 
equitably divided among different political jurisdictions or states, this may lead certain regions to over-rule 
the project. In addition, labour scarcity constraints are very important at the project planning stage. For 
example, it is of limited value to embark on a massive infrastructural project if the skilled personnel 
necessary to execute the project do not exist. 
However, in respect of its relevance to CBA, perhaps the greatest limiting factor is that of finance. 
Fmancial constraints may set limits on the amounts that can be spent by public enterprises or agencies over 
some specified period, including both the initial cost and annual operating costs. These constraints need to 
13. For a detailed discussion on the redistributive effects of a project, see McGuire and Gam (1960) and 
Pearce and Nash (1981). 
14. Several approaches to allowing for risk and uncertainty have been suggested by Pearce (1983); 
Marglin (1967); Fisher (1973); Arrow and Lind (1970); Menges (1974) and Graham (1981). 
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be communicated to the analyst at the start of the CBA to enable the exclusion of alternatives that 
obviously are not feasible. Of major importance in CBA, however, is that where these constraints exist, 
both the form which they assume and the underlying reasons for imposing them should be made explicit. 
They should not be taken for granted or accepted without question. 
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PART THREE: APPLICATION - THE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
OF ELECTRIFICATION IN VENDA 
Invariably, the application of general principles to practical cases permits the relevance of theories to be 
tested and refined. In this section, an attempt is made to realise the objectives of the present study as set out 
in the Introduction - using in most instances, the basic principles that were established in Parts One and Two. 
The chief aim is to outline the nature of the private and external costs and benefits involved in the 
electrification project in Venda, and to point out where further research is necessary to achieve quantification 
of the factors discussed. 
Since the incidence and nature of certain electrification costs and benefits can only be ascertained from 
individual households, it was deemed necessary to survey the population of Makwarela township and its peri-
urban settlement of Lufule-Tshisele. To this end, a questionnaire (Appendix A) was designed with the main 
objective of identifying those private and external costs and benefits which need to be accounted for in 
analysing the role of electricity supply in the process of development in Venda. Accordingly, Chapter 5 is 
devoted to a brief discussion of the data collection and processing procedures employed in the survey and 
Chapter 6 presents a detailed summary of the survey results. 
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CHAPTERS 
BACKGROUND TO SECURING INFORMATION AND PROCESSING 
5.1 DATA COLLECTION 
Empirical research into economic phenomena typically makes use of information collected and published 
by government bodies or research institutions. Frequently, however, the type of data required does not exist 
in published form, thus necessitating the direct collection of information through fieldwork. 
Unquestionably, the types of information sought from respondents constitute a major influence on how the 
information is collected (Moser and Kalton 1986, 240). From the point of view of social research, the major 
types of information fall into the following six categories: behaviour, attitudes and opinions, socioeconomic 
and psychological traits, intentions, knowledge and motivation. With the exception of psychological traits, 
economic research may require all the abovementioned information and this study is no exception. 
The selection of the most appropriate way of data collection rests on a number of universally applicable 
criteria. Schoner and Ubi (1976, 8) have briefly captured these criteria as follows: 
" ... In attempting to collect information from respondents, investigators must strive to 
acquire sufficiently accurate and unambiguous information at appropriate costs and within 
specified time limits". 
This has equal application to all aspects of research· if poor data is collected, poor conclusions will be 
forthcoming. No matter what the basic design of the research is, it is necessary to collect accurate data to 
achieve useful results. Given these criteria and the physical constraints imposed upon the researcher, he or 
she must choose specific means of seeking information. 
In essence, there are two basic ways of collecting surVey data, namely by asking questions and by observing 
(Crimp 1985, 33). "Questioning", as the name suggests, is distinguished by the fact that data is collected by 
asking questions of people who are thought to have the desired information. Questions may be asked in 
person or in writing. On the other hand, when data is collected by observation, researchers ask no 
questions. Instead, they keep track of the objects or actions in which they are interested. No matter what 
research design is used, the necessary data must be collected by one or both of these two methods. Under 
most circumstances, "observational" data is more expensive to obtain than questioning. Strictly speaking, 
direct observation of attitudes, intentions, motivations, knowledge and traits is impossible. According to 
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Boyd et al. (1977, 133), these deficiencies render 'observation' not entirely objective, and consequently 
methods of ' questioning" remain the only feasible way of gathering information. 
Three different methods of communication with questionnaires are available, namely personal interviews, 
by telephone and by mail. Each of the~e methods suffers from various drawbacks and none is superior in all 
situations (Churcbill 1979, 1984). Under most circumstances, the best way to assess the advantages and 
disadvantages of these techniques is by applying a set of criteria such as those proposed by Tull and 
Hawkins (1984, 133), namely informational contro~ sample Control and administrative control. 
10 the first instance, the criterion of informational control centres on the complexity, volume and accuracy 
of the information sought. With respect to the complexity of the. information required, it is argued, for 
obvious reasons, that the more complex the information required of the respondent, the stronger the case 
for personal interviews. 10 addition, personal interviews are deemed most suitable in cases where a large 
quantity of information is required. 
The criterion of sample control focusses on two constituent elements: that of deciding how the universe 
should be defined and the sample drawn. Obviously none of the techniques possesses any special advantage 
in this respect. The chief differences between the three methods of communication arise from the actual 
procurement of information from the sample. The problem here is twofold, primarily that of non-response, 
but also that of ensuring that the person who provides the information is actually the intended respondent. 
It is widely held that personal interviews are the most effective with regard to both aspects. 
10 the final analysis, the dual requirements of limited time and minimum cost are the principal constituents 
in administrative control. When time is considered the crucial variable, the telephone survey is the obvious 
means of communication and personal interviews are the most time-consuming method (Davies 1976, 132). 
Moreover, the high cost of field interviewing tends to be the primary influence in IIlaking personal surveys 
the most expensive of the three methods. It is generally found that telephone surveys rank second in terms 
of cost per respondent, while mail surveys remain the least expensive method. 
Despite the drawbaCks outlined above, most notably the cost factor, the personal interview is in principle 
considered the most desirable means of communication for the purpose of the present study. Stringent 
precautions have been taken to overcome these drawbacks through proper planning, adequate training and 
supervision. In short, it is felt that in this particular study, none of the above disadvantages presents any 
valid reason for rejecting the personal interview as the soundest method of communication. Also, the 
nature of the information sought (i.e. external benefits and costs) suggests that personal interviews may be 
preferable to both mail and telephone interviews. 
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5.2 TIlE USE OF PILOTING 
Piloting plays a vital part in questionnaire development, but too often it consists of just getting interviewers 
to conduct a few interviews to see if the questionnaire "works". Simply using a questionnaire will reveal the 
most obvious ambiguities and incongruities as the informant is likely to ask questions or give answers that 
clearly indicate obvious inconsistencies. 
In this study, the pilot survey consisted of two stages, namely what may be termed an "internal" phase and 
subsequently the actual pre-testing of a group from the popUlation in areas other than those of the target 
regions. During the initial period, draft copies of the questionnaires and a letter covering instructions for 
fieldworkers were given to academics and civil servants for comment. Modified versions of the documents 
were then prepared for use during the first pilot study proper. The respondents for the pilot study were 
chosen at random from Shayandima (a residential urban township) and Itsani (a peri-urban area situated 
near Shayandima), both of which resembled the study areas very closely. 
On the basis of the feedback from respondents during the first pilot study, certain changes were made to 
some of the questions. The major problem with the questionnaire was that not all the variables needed for 
computing the costs and benefits had been included. A second pilot study of the questionnaire in its 
modified form was subsequently conducted in other sections of Shayandima and Itsani. Almost all of the 
alterations made during this second pilot study were of a minor linguistic nature and none of the questions 
required more drastic redrafting. The most striking feature is that the two pilot studies provided the 
opportunity of familiarising the interviewers with the field of study and the research requirements. 
Moreover, the average time taken to complete the questionnaire was determined and found to be about 
twenty minutes. A fmal questionnaire was then drawn up, and it was felt that this final version was in the 
best possible form to collect the required information. 
The fmal questionnaire (Appendix A) was divided into four parts. The first section dealt with general 
information about the interviewer including the date and the time taken to complete the interview. The 
second and third sections focussed upon the household prome as reported by the head of the household. 
Questions dealt with the respondent's position in the household, sex, age, educational level passed, present 
employment and income sources, household size and the number of rooms in the house/homestead. To all 
these questions, the respondent could only give an explicit response or had to select a particular option 
from a series of alternatives. The series of options listed included the category "other", in ease the 
respondent's answer fell into none of the categories listed. 
The final section of the questionnaire attempted to establish whether respondents would prefer to use 
electricity rather than other alternative sources of energy. The respondents were required to specify the 
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types and cost of fuel they use in their houses/homesteads, the electrical appliances they now have and 
those they plan to buy. At this stage it was felt necessary to require the respondents to rank statements 
about the direct and indirect benefits of electricity usage in terms of their importance in the households. In 
sum the information required Was essentially descriptive and questions could be categorised or set out in 
tabular form as well as being open-ended. 
5.3 SAMPLING TECHNIQUES FOR THE MAIN SURVEY 
In order to undertake the main survey, a sketch map of the LufuIe-Tshisele area and a site plan of 
Makwarela township were required. These were obtained from th~ relevant authorities. The population size 
in both -areas was also established. This Was vital for the sample selection and choice of sampling method. 
Accordingly, in an attempt to obtain a representative unbiased sample, random sampling tables were used 
as the means of selecting the cases for study. To this end, a sample of 6% Was drawn for each area. Prinsloo 
(1982, 31) and Preston-White (1982, 44) maintain that a sample of more than 5% is suitable for making 
assumptions about the population being studied. Thus 90 households in Makwarela and 29 households in 
Lufule-Tshisele were visited. 
5.4 DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING 
Training (before the actual fieldwork) allowed fieldworkers to become familiar with the questionnaires and 
with the meaning of the questions. Cross-checks facilitated considerable control over fieldworker 
performance. All questionnaires were checked for completeness and accuracy by the author. The survey 
was carried out in August 1988 by a team of five male fieldworkers. Sample addresses were marked on the 
maps of the Makwarela and LufuIe-Tshisele areas. Every fieldworker was allocated a portion of the map 
each day, together with a list of addresses. This was to avoid the possibility of going to the wrong dwelling. 
Despite the satisfactory nature of the completed questionnaires, the survey did encounter several problems. 
Firstly, the work and school boycotts in protest of the ritual murders in Venda caused a few problems in the 
field. In particular, adequate supplementary fieldwork and the clarification of apparent irregularities and 
errors incurred during the main survey could not be completed. Secondly, the interviews had to be 
conducted in the evenings during the week, at a time which unfortunately coincided with meal times. As the 
fieldworkers all worked full time, it was difficult to obviate this problem. In addition, some respondents, 
especially those in single parent matrilineal households and members of the police unit, seemed reluctant to 
respond. Finally, elderly illiterate people could not supply their age and were uncertain about dates. In 
response to this problem, a list of significant local historical events was drawn up to aid fieldworkers. 
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On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the usual problems of refusals and poorly completed 
questionnaires (i.e. filled in so badly as to be rendered useless) were not encountered. Considerable effort 
was, in fact, taken to ensure that the fieldworkers understood the questions so that the possibility of 
misinterpretation on the part of respondents was reduced. Fieldworkers were also instructed not to 
encourage guesses, and to call back for information not known at the time of the interview. There may have 
been some deliberate provision of incorrect information although fieldworkers were advised to gain the 
ronfidence of the respondent and to explain caiefully the confidentiality of the data. There was no language 
barrier because all the fieldworkers were fully conversant in Venda. In addition, they were reasonably 
familiar with the contents of the questionnaires. 
Respondents in the survey were questioned about the satisfaction of their day to day energy needs. 
Depending upon the issue in question, the respondents acted as spokespersons for themselves or the entire 
household of which they were members. Questions were asked in such a way that the responses elicited, if 
answered accurately, could be considered as objective assessment of energy fulfillment by the entire 
household. 
Once the survey had been completed, a computer package of statistical analysis, namely the Business 
Management Data Processing (BMDP) package was used to analyse the data. In practice, this computer 
package often enables the social researcher to carry out a wide range of statistical procedures and to 
manipulate research data. Simple descriptive statistics such as means, standard deviations, standard errors, 
coefficients of variation, extreme values and frequencies were used to bring order to the raw data and to 
ronstruct the relevant tables and histograms. The results of the survey are summarised in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
IN VENDA: SURVEY FINDINGS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a detailed description of the data of the survey conducted in Venda. Essentially it is 
hoped that this description will assist in the identification of private and external costs and benefits of 
electrification that need to be accounted for in analysing the role of electricity supply in the process of 
development in Venda. However, before an interpretation of the survey results can be made, it is deemed 
necessary to present a brief account of conditions that were found to exist in the survey areas. 
To begin with, it is essential to note that all houses (some 1 489 in August 1988) in Makwarela township 
already have access to electricity, although not everyone makes use of this service. Those individual 
households who do not have electricity either cannot afford the high connection and other installation 
charges, have houses presently under construction or have had their supplies cut off through defaults on the 
payment of electricity bills. In these instances, households are forced to rely on other fuels such as gas, 
wood, coal, candles and parafftn. 
In the Lufule·Tshisele area, few people have electricity. A visit to the area revealed that less than fifteen 
households out of about 480 in August 1988, including all existing business outlets, had access to electricity. 
Most of these are situated close to the main road and the existing power line that has been erected in the area. 
6.2 BASIC TRENDS 
6.2.1 Income 
A number of basic trends were evident from the research results. As far as income levels were concerned, 
it appeared that households in the Makwarela area earned or received an average income of R729,06 per 
month while those in the Lufule-Tshisele area earned or received a monthly average of R496,89 (Figures 6.1 
and 6.2 overleaf). The low income figure in the Lufule-Tshisele area is consistent with the survey's finding 
that the majority of households in the area were headed by females who were either not employed 
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at 011. or were informally employed. Accordingly, these families were found to be heavily dependent on 
monthly remittances from the household heod/father who was usually employed as a migrant labourer in 
the neighbouring urban areas. Furthermore, a higher percentage (about 73%) of households in the Lufule-
Tshisele area was found to be earning below R600,OO per month as opposed to a low figure (about 57%) 
recorded in the Makwarela area. 
6.2.2 The extent of energy usage 
Wood, paraffin and candles constituted the most commonly used fuels in the Lufule-Tshisele area. Wood 
and paraffin were predominantly used for cooking and heating purposes while candles and to a lesser 
extent, paraffin were largely utilised for lighting purposes. Different trends were apparent in Makwarela 
where electricity was observed to account for the major share of domestic energy consunaption. This broad 
use of electricity for all household chores was not surprising as all households already have access to it. 
Most of the wood consumed in the two areas is bought from vendors, though in the Lufule-Tshisele area it 
can also be collected from the nearby bush. It appeared that the use of wood and other fuels such as coal 
was a function of marketing and their availability through vendors. Nine of the households interviewed in 
the two areas also had small petrol driven generators. Another feature was the prevalence of dry cell 
batteries as well as car batteries in the Lufule-Tshisele area. These were used mostly to power radios 
and/or television sets. Car batteries were, however, allowed to run completely flat before being carried to 
the nearest service station in Thohoyandou town for recharging. 
6.2.3 ~Iectricity 
An overwhelming majority (about 92%) of the community in the two areas wonld prefer to use electricity 
for household chores such as cooking, heating and lighting rather than its substitutes. The remaining 8% of 
those interviewed stated that they would not prefer electricity due to perceived cost implications. In spite of 
the overwhelming desire for electricity services, only about 61 % of those interviewed in the Makwarela area 
were found to be utilising electricity and had already paid the deposit fee that all domestic consunaers -
whether living in or using government -owned property or not - are required to pay before being 
connected1 In the Lufule-Tshisele area, only one household of those interviewed was found to be making 
use of electricity services. Generally speaking, the slack use of electricity by households in the two areas can 
be related to the willingness to pay concept introduced in Chapter 4. In this instance, it appeared from the 
survey that households perceived private costs of electricity to exceed private benefits and as a resuit, they 
were not prepared to pay for the service. This trend was confirmed by the fact that many respondents in the 
1. Before October 1988, the deposit fee for electricity charged by the Venda Electricity Corporation 
(VEC) used to be R120,OO. This amount has since been raised to R145,OO. 
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two areas did not own many electrical appliances (see Table 6.1), particularly those households in the 
Lufule-Tshisele area where electricity was not readily available. As a result, it was not surprising to note 
that many respondents in the two areas were found to own a substantial proportion of non-electrical 
appliances (see Table 6.2), notably those that are useful for cooking, heating and lighting purposes such as 
paraffin stoves and lamps. 
Those who had not yet paid the mandatory deposit fee and were thus ineligible to use the electrical services 
gave obvious reasons for not doing so, such as a lack of funds and the' fact that their houses were "presently 
under construction". Generally speaking, these two reasons are acceptable as ' they form part of the main 
determinants of household demand. In practice, even if large ~ubsidies are offered on electricity rates, 
electrical appliances and their running costs can still be expensive for a low income family. Furthermore, it 
is often those families seeking better housing who are likely to want electricity (Jansen 1988, 3). In other 
words, an important fact to consider is that some kind of solidity pr permanence in house structure is an 
important indicator of the likely demand for electricity. In addition, the extent to which electricity is used 
tends to increase with proximity to the modem sector both in geographical sense as well as in terms of the 
amount of contact individuals have had with this sector. 
6.3 COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ELECTRICI1Y 
Having outlined the main features of the survey fIndings in the preceding section, it is now appropriate to 
identify and evaluate the relative importance of some of the private and external costs and benefIts of 
electricity vis-a.-vis those associated with alternative sources of energy. However, for the purpose of the 
present study, the ensuing discussion will concentrate only on those fIndings that are considered relevant. 
Accordingly, an attempt will be made to distinguish between the various private and external effects as 
defIned in Chapter 4. 
6.3.1 Benefits 
As far as the vario'us benefIts are concerned, the survey indicated a strong preference for electricity to 
alternative forms of energy; in other words, respondents tended to place a much higher value on both the 
private and external benefIts associated with electricity. 
6.3.1.1 Private benefits 
There was general agreement amongst the respondents that electricity was a more convenient and safer 
service capable of providing much greater comfort than alternative fuels. Users of electricity pointed au! 
that its plug-in capability was a source of much convenience because it enabled them to carry out household 
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TABLE 6.1: POSSESSION OF ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES: LUFULE-TSmSELE AND 
MAKW ARELA AREAS, AUGUST 1988 
NUMBER WHO PERCENTAGE NUMBER WHO DO PERCENTAGE 
OWNELEC- WHO OWN NOT OWN ELEC- WHO DO NOT 
TRICAL ELECTRICAL TRICAL OWNELEC-
APPLIANCES APPLIANCES APPLIANCES TRlCAL 
APPLIANCES 
Lufule Makwa- Lufule Makwa- Lufule Makwa- Lufule Makwa-
Tshi- rela Tshi- rela Tshi- rela Tshi- rela 
sele sele sele seIe 
ELECTRICAL 
APPLIANCES 
Refrigerator 4 41 13,8 45,6 25 49 86,2 54,4 
Dishwasher - 2 - 2,2 29 88 100,0 97,8 
Kettle 2 34 6,9 37,8 27 56 93,1 62,2 
Freezer - 5 - 5,6 29 85 100,0 94,4 
Washing machine - 1 - 1,1 29 89 100,0 98,9 
Power tools 1 4 3,4 4,4 28 86 %,6 95,6 
Sewing machine 1 - 3 3,4 3,3 28 87 96,6 96,7 
TV 6 46 20,7 51,1 23 44 79,3 48,9 
Stove 1 45 3,4 50,0 28 45 96,6 50,0 
Hi-Ii 7 31 24,1 34,4 22 59 75,9 65,6 
Radio 6 34 20,7 37,8 23 56 79,3 62,2 
Iron 2 50 6,9 55,6 27 40 93,1 44,4 
Heater 1 40 3,4 44,4 28 50 %,6 55,6 
Geyser 1 21 3,4 23,3 28 69 %,6 76,7 
71 
TABLE 6.2: POSSESSION OF NON-ELEcrRlCAL APPUANCES: LUFULE-TSmSELE AND 
MAKWARELAAREAS, AUGUST 1988 
NUMBER WHO PERCENTAGE NUMBER WHO PERCENTAGE 
OWN NON- WHO OWN NON- DO NOT OWN WHO DO NOT 
ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL NON- OWN NON-
APPUANCES APPUANCES ELEcrRlCAL ELEcrRlCAL 
APPUANCES APPUANCES 
Lufule- Makwa- Lufule- Makwa- Lufule- Makwa- Lufule Makwa-
Tshi- rela Tshi- rela Tshi- rela Tshi- rela 
sele sele sele sele 
, 
NON-ELECTRICAL 
APPUANCES 
Gas heater 1 5 3,4 5,6 28 85 96,6 94,4 
Gas stove 5 38 17,2 42,2 24 52 82,8 57,8 
Gas lamp 1 8 3,4 8,9 28 82 96,6 91,1 
Gas geyser - -
- -
29 90 100,0 100,0 
Paraffm stove 19 53 65,5 58,9 10 37 34,5 41,1 
Paraffin lamp 22 36 75,9 40,0 7 54 24,1 60,0 
Paraffm heater 1 8 3,4 8,9 28 82 96,6 91,1 
Paraffm 
refrigerator 2 4 6,9 4,4 27 86 93,1 95,6 
Kettle 25 75 86,2 83,3 4 15 13,8 16,7 
Wood stove 1 1 3,4 1,1 28 89 96,6 98,9 
Coal stove 2 14 6,9 15,6 27 76 93,1 84,4 
Oil stove - - - - 29 90 100,0 100,0 
Iron 23 55 79,3 61,1 6 35 20,7 38,9 
Hi-Ii 2 11 6,9 12,2 27 79 93,1 87,8 
Radio 28 44 96,6 48,9 1 46 3,4 51,1 
Sewing machine 4 11 13,8 12,2 25 79 86,2 87,8 
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tasks more rapidly than before and save much time and effort in the process. This contrasted sharply with 
the round trip of about 3,3 kilometres which residents had to complete previously in order to collect 
firewood in the Lufule-Tshisele district (see Table 63 on the time and distances involved in gathering 
alternative sources of energy). Many respondents in this area complained of the growing shortage of 
firewood and the resultant increase in the length of journey. They also mentioned the necessity to go out 
when ill, or in rain, and even at the risk of falling victim to ritnal murder or being attacked by wild animals 
in the woodlands. Likewise, gas cylinders and car batteries were reportedly cumbersome to handle. 
Respondents generally perceived electricity to provide better lighting, heating and personal security than 
other energy forms. Household heads in Makwarela stated ,that the introduction of electricity had 
significantly improved health conditions and reduced the risk of damage to personal property. They also felt 
that electricity was an important means of improving the educational standards of individual users within 
the household. These advantages can be viewed as private benefits. which accrue to the individual users of 
electricity themselves. 
6.3.1.2 External benefits 
(a) Technological 
As far as technological external benefits were concerned, a consumer-ta-consumer linkage emerged from 
the survey. Respondents who are using electricity in their homes mentioned that the quality of family life as 
well as that of friends and relatives had considerably improved by adequate heating and better lighting. 
Specifically, respondents in Makwarela indicated that the presence of a television set in the home was an 
important focal point of entertainment not only for the family but also for visiting relatives and friends. The 
security of neighbours and passers-by was also seen to have improved as a result of electric lights installed 
outdoors. 
It was also evident from the survey that certain producer-consumer external benefits arose from 
electrification. Street lighting was considered to have contributed to a significant drop in the number of 
criminal acts in the Makwarela area. Respondents also mentioned that the introduction of electricity made 
it easier to organise and attend social events such as wedding receptions, funeral night vigils and meetings 
at the community centre and churches in the evening. Given the structure of urban township societies, this 
is arguably one of the most important and neglected external benefits of electrification. 
(b) Pecuniary 
In addition to the above technological external benefits, electricity may also give rise to certain pecuniary 
external benefits which exceed those associated with alternative energies. A comprehensive programme of 
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TABLE 6.3: A YERAGE DISTANCE, TIME AND NUMBER OF TRIPS INVOL YED IN FUEL 
CONSUMPTION: LUFULE-TSHISELE AND MAKWARELA AREAS, AUGUST 1988' 
FUEL MOST COMMON DISTANCE PER TIME PER NUMBER OF 
USED METHOD USED RETURN TRIP RETURN TRIP TRIPS PER 
TO FETCH FUEL IN KILOMETERS IN MINUTES MONTH 
Lufule- Makwa- Lufule- Makwa- Lufule- Makwa- Lufule- Makwa-
Tshi- rela Tshi- rela Tshi- rela Tshi- rela 
Wood walk walk 3,3 5,9 3h 19m lh02m 1 1 
Coal - walk - 2 - 22,5m - 1 
ParaffIn walk walk 7,5 4,1 lh09m 41,7m 1 1 
Gas walk walk 7,6 4,2 43m 44,8m 1 1 
Candles walk walk 5,1 3,7 1h Olm 39,2m 1 1 
• Table 6.3 takes into account the distance, time and number of trips covered in cases where respondents had 
to walk only. If other methods used to fetch fuel had been considered (e.g. own car, delivery van, etc.), the 
figures for the time taken wonld have been smaller than those indicated in the tahle, but, of course, all of 
these alternatives are costly. The choice to walk seems to indicate that the cost of the time used in walking is 
less for the residents than the cost of alternative transport arrangements. 
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electrification is likely to boost both the demand for and supply of electrical appliances such as television 
sets, refrigerators, smoothing irons and stoves, and ultimately also the demand for productive inputs used in 
these industries. The introduction of electricity may likewise encourage existing industries and business 
enterprises to expand their operations, or induce new ones to establish themselves in the area, thus creating 
new job opportunities for the unemployed and underemployed. Similarly, to the extent that electricity 
improves the health and education standards of individual users, it may ultimately generate positive 
spillover effects on other consumers and producers alike. 
6.3.2 Costs 
Turning now to the various costs involved, the following survey hi'gJuights emerged. 
6.3.2.1 Private (monetary) cost 
The survey found that the private (or monetary) cost of electricity far exceeded the corresponding costs of 
alternative energy sources. The average amount spent on energy requirements (including wood, paraffin, 
gas and candles) by those households that did not use electricity in the Lufule-Tshisele and Makwarela 
areas came to R20,57 and R21,71 per month respectively (see Table 6.4). This compared with an average 
amount of R53,77 spent on electricity (not including the deposit fee of R145,OO and other standard 
electricity charges indicated in Table 6.5) by the remaining households in the two areas. These findings 
clearly contradict Rivett-Camac's (1979, 9) assertion that the introduction of electricity in domestic 
consumption usually reduce energy bills to a considerable extent. The contrary appears to be true of 
Lufule-Tshisele and Makwarela where the additional costs due to electrification amounted to R33,13 and 
R32,06 per month respectively. Small wonder, then, that all individual users in the two areas indicated that 
they would prefer to pay a lower monthly electricity bill ranging between R15,OO and R45,OO because they 
were, at present, utilising it at great cost to themselves. 
6.3.2.2 External costs 
As far as external effects were concerned, certain technological costs of a consumer-consumer and 
consumer-producer nature were found to be significant in the case of alternative energy sources but 
virtually non-existent in the case of electricity. Respondents in both areas mentioned the constant high risk 
of damage and injuries to others in the form of open fires. In one extreme case, a respondent in the Lufule-
Tshisele area recounted how a gas fire once set his house ablaze and in the process completely gutted an 
adjaccnt resident's two thatch-covered houses. Several gutted houses in the Lufule-Tshisele area bore 
testimony to the danger that open fIres and gas stoves may pose to people and property. Individual users of 
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TABLE 6.4: AVERAGE MONTIIL Y HOUSEHOlD FUEL EXPENDITURE: LUFULE-TSmSELE 
AND MAKWARElA AREAS, AUGUST 1988 
EXPENDITURE AVERAGE PERCENTAGE RANGE OF 
(RANDS) OF HOUSEHOlD EXPENDITURE 
INCOME(%) (RANDS) 
Lufule- Makwa- Lufule- Makwa- Lufule- Makwa-
Tshisele rela Tshisele rela Tshisele rela 
FUEL USED 
Wood 9,68 4,98 1,94 0,68 0-50 O-SO 
, 
Coal" - 1,13 - 0,15 - 0-33 
ParaffIn 7,31 8,03 1,47 1,10 0-20 0-50 
Gas 1,79 6,32 0,36 0,86 0-30 0-45 
Candles 1,79 1,25 0,36 0,17 0-15 0-15 
Electricity - 53,77 - 7;37' - 0-265 
, This fIgure corresponds well with the 7,74% recorded in a survey undertaken in 1984 in a range of Cape 
Town suburbs (Eberhard 1984, 2). 
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TABLE 6.5: ELECTRICITY STANDARD CHARGES FOR DOMESTIC AND INDUSTRIAL 
USERS IN VENDA 
VENDA ELECTRICITY CORPORATION 
STANDARD CHARGES (RANDS) - 1989 
URBAN RURAL 
1 Phase 3 Phase 1 Phase 3 Phase 
Connection fee 100 300 120 400 
Re-connection fee 30 30 30 30 
Meter test fee 25 
, 
45 25 45 
Meter test fee MD1 
- 60 - 60 
Special meter reading at consumer's request 10 10 10 10 
inspection of existing installation 
(e.g. extensions) 30 45 30 45 
Re-inspection of a new installation 30 30 30 30 
Call-out fee (when it is found that the 
fault was on the consumer's side) 30 30 30 30 
Deposits: Before being connected all consumers must pay a power account deposit selected from 
the table below to suit the type and size of load. 
Tariff C Domestic R145,oo (R2O,oo down plus RlO,oo/month) 
TariffB 10kVA R230,oo 
16kVA 330,00 
20kVA 510,00 
30kVA 730,00 
40kVA 960,00 
50kVA 1420,00 
75kVA 2100,00 
100kVA 2790,00 
TI 
alternative energy fuels all indicated that smoke pollution emitted from coal and wood fires was a constant 
danger to the health of the community. 
In addition to the above effects, there are other external costs associated with alternative energy sources 
that need to be identified. The excessive use of woodfuel is, of course, usually accompanied by the more 
serious problem of deforestation. More specifically, the excessive cutting of wood by individuals and the 
consequent use of substitutes such as dung and other waste materials means that other users now have to 
contend with greater shortages and longer distances in' search of wood. At the same time, farmers 
'(producers) in the area have to contend with lower soil fertility, dwindling Crop yields and a scarcity of 
livestock feed, all of which can be partly attributed to the use of wood and other hazardous sources of 
energy. 
6.4 COST-BENEFIT CALCULATION 
Having outlined the numerous costs and benefits pertaining to electricity and alternative sources of energy 
in the preceding section, this part is devoted to a quantification of the private costs and benefits relating to 
electricity. This quantification is deemed necessary because of the policy implications that are envisaged 
from the above survey fIDdings. However, before this calculation can be made, two essential points need to 
be considered. In the first place, it should be noted that, unlike in conventional CBA where a cost-benefit 
assessment is directed at (or relates to) some well-identified project or programme per se, the present 
study focusses, as indicated in the introductory chapter, on costs and benefits of various kinds that accrue to 
users or consumers of electricity in Venda. This specific focus is necessitated by the fact that Venda has an 
already well-established electricity supply institution - the Venda Electricity Corporation Ltd.2 In this 
regard, the cost-benefit calculation presented here is directed at determining the social desirability of 
extending the supply of electricity in Venda - and not the evaluation of some proposed new system. 
In the second place, very few of the costs and benefits identified in the previous section can be quantified 
and incorporated into a standard CBA. In particular, procedures involved in the valuation of external costs 
and benefits of any public project are both complicated and controversial at best, and, as noted earlier in 
chapter 4, many economists have argued that the most sensible possibility should be to mention these 
2. The Venda Electricity Corporation (VEC) was established on 1 April 1987 as a fully autonomous, self-
accounting, self-fmancing and legally licensed body corporate. It is responsible for the administration, 
management and handling of all aspects regarding the procurement and distribution of electricity in 
Venda. In particular, it has taken over assets of Eskom within Venda which form part of the existing 
interconnected system and has assumed responsibility to negotiate loans with the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) of South Africa and with the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) in respect to a new transmission system that !has been erected to supply electricity to Venda. 
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external effects in a qualitative manner3 Consequently, a similar qualitative procedure will be followed in 
this study. Nevertheless, it is considered essential here to examine the case of private costs and benefits 
which may at least facilitate further qualitative discussion. A private cost-benefit table is thus computed in 
Table 6.6. 
6.5 APPRAISAL OF FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In our illustrative example presented in Table 6.6, it is evident that the private costs of electricity 
consumption are equal in value at least to private benefits. The reason for this equality is that the survey 
sample of electricity users had paid installation charges, must .carry maintenance charges and also paid 
monthly charges and had not - by defaulting on payments - had themselves cut off from the service. In view 
of this, it was presumed that their private benefits were equal in value to all charges. Essentially, however, it 
should be borne in mind that no attempt was made to include ext~rnal benefits to electricity consumption 
due to invidious valuation problems.4 The argument here is that since the survey results reveal that these 
additional benefits tip the scale, then if they were easily calculable and included in the calculation, benefits 
would presumably exceed costs. This conclusion would, in a general economic sense,suggest that increased 
consumption of electricity should be encouraged through a lower tariff. Expansion or extension of 
electricity supply would now imply simply increased consumption (and generation) of electricity as a result 
of lower tariff - whether with given generation capacity or increased capacity (in the long-run). 
In essence, however, the survey work makes it clear that there are a number of additional factors which are 
important enough to warrant consideration in assessing the social desirability of extending the supply of 
electricity in Venda. 
In the first place, the survey indicated that the private (or monetary) cost of electricity was much higher 
than the corresponding cost of alternative energies. This may be partIy related to the "public utility" 
character of Venda Electricity Corporation. The latter is reported to be a decreasing cost industry which 
has to set its price equal to average cost in order to break even.5 Secondly, most of the respondents felt that 
the external costs of alternative energies were very considerable indeed, but that no such costs existed in the 
case of electricity. Finally, there was general agreement amongst the respondents that both the private and 
3. A detailed discussion on external effects affecting infrastructural projects is given by Sewell et aI. 
(1961, 19) and Little and Mirrlees (1974, 348). 
4. As already mentioned in Section 6.3.2.2, the survey results indicated that external costs were virtually 
non-existent in the case of electricity but were found to be significant in the case of alternative energy 
sources. 
5. Personal communication with the chief executive and the public relations divisions of the Venda 
Electricity Corporation. 
TABLE 6.6: ANALYSIS OF COSTS AND BENEATS OF ELECfRICITY PERTAINING TO RESPONDENTS FOUND UTILISING THE SERVICE IN THE LUFULE-TSHISELE AND MAKWARELA AREAS 
AUGUST 1988 ' 
COSTS BENEFITS 
y,,, Insta.1- Mainte- MODthly 0",,, Discount factor Prescnt worth Benefits Discount factor Present worth 
lation nan" PaymeDts Costs 8% 12% 15% 8% 12% 15% Inbc 8% 11% 15% 8% 11% 15% 
Costs Cosu received 
'I RU7385 R11315 R43177,31 RI81 m,31 ,926 ,893 ,870 Rl68 418,39 RI62416,44 RI58 233,26 RI81877~1 ,926 ,893 ,870 . RI68 418~9 R162416,44 R158233,26 
" 
a 11315 47102,.52 58417,52 ,857 ,797 ,756 50 063,82 46 558,76 44 163,65 58 417,52 ,857 ,797 ,756 50 063,82 46 558,76 44 163,65 
" 
a 11315 47 102,.52 58417,52 ,794 ,712 ,658 46 383,51 41593,27 38 438,73 58417,52 ,794 ,712 ,658 46 383,51 41593,27 38 438,73 
" 
a 11315 47102,52 58417,52 ,735 ,636 ,572 42936,RS 37153,54 33414,82 58 417,52 ,735 ,636 ,572 42936,88 37 153,54 33414,82 
" 
a 11315 47102,52 58417,52 ,681 ,567 ,497 39782,33 33 121,73 29 033,51 58417,52 ,681 ,567 ,497 39~3 33 122,73 29033,5 1 
~ a 11315 47102,.52 58 417,52 ,630 ,507 ,432 36 803,04 29 617,68 25 236~7 58 417,52 ,630 ,507 ,432 36 803,04 29 6i7,68 25 236~7 
" 
a 11315 47102,.52 58 417,52 ,583 ,452 ,376 34 057,41 26 404,72 21964,99 58 417,52 ,583 ,452 ~76 34 057,41 26 404,72 21964,99 
~ a 11315 47102,52 58 417,52 ,540 ,404 ,327 31545,46 23 600,68 19 102,53 58417,52 ,540 ,404 ;321 31545,46 23 600,68 19 102,53 
" 
a 11315 47102,52 58 417,52 ,500 ,361 ,284 29 208,76 21 088,73 16590,58 58 417,52 ,500 ,361 ,284 29 2:08,76 21088,73 16 590,58 
Ito a 11315 47 102,.52 58 417,52 ,463 ~22 ,247 1:1 047,31 18810,44 14429,13 58 417,52 ,463 ~22 ,247 T1 047,31 18810,44 14429,13 
'II a 11315 47102,52 58417,52 ,429 ,287 ,215 25 06 1,12 16 765,83 12559,77 58 417,52 ,429 ,287 ,215 
25 061,12 16765,83 U 559,77 
112 a 11315 47102,.52 58 417,52 ,397 ,257 ,187 23 191,76 15013,30 10 924,08 58 417,52 ,397 ,257 ,187 23 191,76 15 013,30 10924,08 
t tl a 11315 47 102,52 58417,52 ,368 ,229 ,163 21497,65 13 377,61 9522,06 58417,52 ,368 ,229 ,163 21497,65 13 377,61 9 522,06 
'I. a 11315 47102,52 58417,52 ,340 ,205 ,141 19861,96 11 975,59 8236,87 58 417,52 ,540 ,205 ,141 19861,96 11 975,59 8236,87 
Its a 11315 47 t02,52 58417,52 ,315 ,183 ,123 18401,52 10690,41 7185,36 58417,52 ~15 ,183 ,123 18401,52 10 690,41 7185,36 
'to 0 11315 47 102,52 58 417,52 ,292 ,163 ,107 17 057,92 9522,06 6250,67 58 417,52 ,292 
,163 ,107 17 057,92 9522,06 6250,67 
'17 0 11315 47 10~52 58 417,52 ,270 ,146 ,093 IS 772,73 8528,96 5 43~83 58417,52 ,270 ,146 ,093 
15772,73 8528,96 5432,83 
'I' a 11315 47102,52 58 417,52 ,250 ,130 ,OSI 14604,38 7594,28 4731,82 58 417,52 ,250 ,130 ,OSI 14604,38 7594,28 4731,82 
'19 a 11315 47102,52 58417,52 ,232 ,116 ,070 13552,87 6776,43 4089,23 58 417,52 ,232 ,116 .. ,070 13 55~87 6776,43 
4089,23 
120 0 11315 47102,52 58417,52 ,215 ,104 ,061 12 559,77 6075,42 3563,47 58 417,52 _ ,215 ,104 ,061 12 559,77 6075,42 3 563,47 
'21 a 11315 47102,52 58417,52 ,199 ,093 ,053 11625,09 5432,83 3096,13 58417,52 ,199 ,093 ,053 11 625,09 5432,83 3096,13 
'" 
0 11315 47102,52 58417,52 ,184 ,083 ,046 10 748,82 4848,65 2687,21 58 417,52 ,184 ,083 ,046 10748,82 4848,65 2687,21 
'23 a 11315 47102,.52 58417,52 ,170 ,074 ,040 9930,98 4322,90 2336,70 58417,52 ,170 ,074 ,040 
9930,98 4322,90 2336,70 
12. a 11315 47 t02,52 58417,52 ,158 ,066 ,035 9229,97 3855,56 2044,61 58 417,52 ,158 ,066 ,035 9219,97 3855,56 
2044,61 
I" 0 11315 47 102,52 58417,52 ,146 ,059 ,030 8528,96 3446,63 1752,53 
58 417,52 ,146 ,059 ,030 8528,96 3446,63 1752,53 
I 
~ 
I 
TOTAL Rl27 385 R282 875 Rll73 637,80 Rl 583 897,80 10,67S 7,!W3 6,464 R737872,41 R568 593,45 R485 020,91 Rl S83 897,80 10,675 7,843 6,464 R737 872,41 R568593,45 R485 02D,91 ! I 
ij 
ii) 
ill) 
,j 
bj 
,j 
All computalions in Table 6.6 are based OD the survey fIndings as well as on i.nlormatioD OD 
electricity cbarges outlined in Table 6.5. 
Calculations are made ooly for individual users of electricity in the Makwarela and Lufule·Tsbisele 
areas. In the survey. tbese usc.rs comprised only 61% of the respondeots. This can be calculated as 
folloWi: 
61% x no. or respondeots .. M x119 
100 
72.59 or 
13 individual users, 
The t25 period is used for illustration purposes. It is, however, based on the contention made by 
Gittinger (1980, 87) that the economic lire 10 be used in computing costs and benefits of 
infrastructural projects should be about 20 to 2S years because, due to discounting, returns beyond 25 
years are alleged to make DO differeDce in tbe evaluation of such projects. 
Project costs 
Figures used (or computing mainlCDancc and some of the capital costs are tbose pertaining to a 
single (or 1 Phase) supply system outlined in Table 65. In Venda, the 1 Phase system is often used to 
relay power to housing and small business premises. 
b) Installation costs comprise of the follo"';ng components: 
oj 
ConnectioD. fee It DO. of individual users: RlOO It 73 R7300 
Deposit fee x D.o. of individual users: R145 x 73 - RIO 585 
Wiring costs x DO. of iowvidual users: Rl500x7Ju ~ 
Total = 
The wiring costs amount varies according to the size of the premise. The above amount of Rl 500 is 
an estimated figure charged for a 6-roomed bouse by authorized wiring operators who are registered 
with the Venda Electricily Corporation (VEC). This figure was obtained from the Public Relations 
office at VEC. 
The maintenance costs are items 2 to 7 or all the other standard charges except tbe connection fee in 
Table 6.5. For our illustrative purposes. it is assumed that each of items 2 to 7 in Table 6.5 may affect 
every household using electricily once a year. Thus maintenance costs 
standard charges except connection fee x DO of users 
RI55 x73 
R1l31S. 
d) The monthly payment amounts are compUied as follows: 
11: R53,71 (monthly average) x 11 months x 73 " R43171,3I, assuming for illustrative purposes that 
individual users will devote the rLTst month of t110 all initial connection work. 
12 to t25: R53,77 x 12 months x 73 - R47 102,52. 
e) Gross costs - Installation costs + maintenance + monthly payments. 
iv) 
vj 
The discount factor 
Although there is an arbitrary element ~ settling for an appropriate discount rate in most practical 
cases, GiUinger (1980, 61) recommends that the opportunity cost of capital in the society which is in 
tbe neighbourhood of about g% to 15% sbould be used in underdeveloped co uDlries. For our 
computations we will assume discount rates of 8%, 12% and 15% to indicate cases where individual 
users of electricity Tluu:: future consumption lowly, averagely and highly, respectively. A cODvenient 
sct of Compounding and Piscounling Tables (or Projecl Evaluation publisbed by tbe Economic 
Development Institute of the World Bank was used to compute these discount rates. 
Benefits to be received 
Calculating Ibe willingneu to pay (WT'P) from the sllIVCy fmding! was a problem. This was because 
respondents indicated their willingness to pay amounts that were far less tban even tbeir monthly 
average payments of R53,71. However, since our sample of electricity users had paid installation 
charges, ID.l.!.ll carry maintenaucc cbargu and also paid mootbly cbarges and had not - by 
defaulting on payments - had tbemselves cut off from lhe service, it was presumed that 
their private benefits were equal in value at least to all charges (i.e. installation, 
maintenance and monthly payments). This can be calculated as follows: 
Benefits to 
be received 
Installation 
Costs + 
Maintenance 
Costs + 
Monthly 
Payments 
2!l 
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external benefits derived from electricity were much greater than those associated with alternative energies. 
As far as the external benefits from electricity are concerned, it was possible to identify several 
technological externalities of a consumer-consumer and producer-consumer kind, as well as certain 
pecuniary externalities which can be expected to boost incomes and employment not only in the Venda 
region, but also in towns and cities elsewhere in Southern Africa. 
The situation as regards electricity supply in Venda can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 6.3. The 
supplier is, as mentioned before, reported to be a naturai monopolist experiencing decreasing costs and 
setting price equal to the average (social) cost of production. It thus supplies OQ units of electricity at price 
OP in Figure 6.3. As a first step towards piecemeal optimization (Wallis, 1984), the authorities might 
, 
consider setting the price of electricity equal (or close) to marginal cost by means of an appropriate subsidy 
- that is, point C in Figure 63. However, this would imply that the marginal social benefit exceeds marginal 
social cost by the distance Be. It may therefore be justifiable to 1D:atch marginal social cost and benefit by 
means of a unit subsidy equal to HG, in which case the price paid by consumers wonld be OF and quantity 
supplied OR, while the supply authority would be breaking even at point H. 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, there are, however, several problems associated with the practical 
implementation of a subsidy scheme. The state may have to levy or increase taxes elsewhere in the economy 
in order to raise the revenue necessary to pay for the subsidy. Such a tax hike will reduce the disposable 
incomes of taxpayers and change the distribution of income and may also have an adverse effect ou 
productivity levels in the economy as a whole. In addition, the public utility may be less inclined to minimise 
costs and maintain an acceptable level of X-efficiency under a subsidy scheme (Leibenstein, 1978) while the 
administration of the scheme itself may impose additional costs on the community. 
Alternatively, the supply authority might consider a multi-part pricing scheme which discriminates between 
consumers in accordance with the quantity of the service they consume. In the example of Figure 6.3, a 
price of OP could thus be charged for ail units consumed up to OQ and a lower price OF for additional 
units, and so on. The basic intent of such a scheme is, of course, to capture for the supplier a portion of the 
surplus that would otherwise go to consumers. Of more importance, however, is the fact that a multi-part 
tariff may enable the economy to reach the optimal point W (in Ftgure 6.3) at little or no cost to the 
taxpayer. 
But price discrimination is rarely desirable and often not feasible. Its major drawback is that it tends to 
discriminate against the smail consumer who may well choose to forego the service if the fixed price 
charged for initial units has to be very high. Likewise, multi-part tariffs often require sophisticated metering 
devices, extensive computation and administration as well as additional manpower which may significantly 
82 
Price 
P --------
E H 
: ,,:-~1~~~~~~-----ASC 
: W, " MSC 
1 I " F ------------------t----------- 'G "MSB 
I 
: D=MPB 
OL---------------~Q----------~R~------------~ 
Quantity 
Figure 63: THE EFFEcr OF A SUBSIDY IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNAL 
BENEFITS 
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add to the cost of the service. It may therefore be necessary to combine a multipart tariff with an 
appropriate subsidy in order to provide a cost-effective and efficient system of electrification. 
On the whole, the Venda survey seems to suggest that an economic case can indeed be made for involving 
the broader community in subsidising the supply of electricity in Makwarela and Lufule-Tshisele. This may 
be achieved either by a subsidy paid for by the South African or Venda governments, or by means of cross-
subsidisation within the Eskom organisation itself. While such a subsidy can perhaps be justified on 
distributional grounds alone, and more specifically in terms of the rapid and pronounced effect it is likely to 
have on the quality of life in the area, its real worth lies in the fact that it may confer certain external 
benefits on the community. These include increased levels of production and employment in the Venda 
regio~ an improvement in health conditions and the creation of an environment conducive to furthering 
education and schooling amongst the consuming public. 
Some of these externalities are likely to have a profound effect on producers and consumers outside Venda, 
and it therefore seems reasonable to argue that the required subsidy should be paid for by both the Venda 
and South African governments. But this does not mean that the subsidy should become a permanent 
feature of public policy in Southern Africa: to the extent that it does boost the earning capacity of the users 
of electricity, the need for it will ultimately disappear. It should therefore do what a subsidy is supposed to 
do - that is, provide temporary assistance in situations where markets fail. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter 1, the objectives of the study were outlined which were believed to be generally applicable to 
electricity supply in a developing country. In the subsequent chapters, the general theoretical background of 
economic development, electricity supply and public utilities was given with an emphasis on the description 
of the objectives of economic development and the characteristics of public utilities. This was followed by a 
general overview of cost-benefit analysis wh.ich, in particular, incorporated an identification of the private 
and external costs and benefits of electrification. The general approach was then applied to eloctricity supply 
in two small areas in Venda which has only recently established an authority to develop the region's 
electricity supply system. Particular attention was given to the affordability of electricity to consumers, the 
replicability of a possible supply as well as the sustainability of an electrification project. 
The study found that with the exception of the cost implications to consumers, electricity supply is an 
important commodity to a community in a developing region in as far as it possesses many private and 
external benefits over its substitutes. It was pointed out that electricity is important for essential housebold 
chores such as cooking, heating and lighting, and convenient in that it saves time and improves the standard 
of living. The plug-in capability was perceived as a source of great convenience to the household as is the 
continuity of supply. As well as its contribution to the development and improvement of social life, electricity 
was found to be an essential commodity for the overall development of a community. To tills end, it was 
concluded in the study that if a government considers that encouragement of electrification is advantageous to 
a country in the same way as other development policies, then there is every reason for it to subsidise 
expansion of tbe system. 
However, expansion has to take into account changing environmental conditions. It should be compatible 
with the political and social characteristics of the community, and economically viable within the wider 
sphere of economic development. Patterns of development in other regions under similar conditions may be 
used as guidelines for expansion, but need to be adapted to the specific environment, objectives and strategy 
of an electricity supply utility. The supply utility should also consider the suitability to the development of 
the region of the technologies it introduces and supports. Furthermore, expansion of the electricity 
system will create a demand for technical staff, and plans for specific training should accordingly 
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be incorporated into any proposals to extend electricity supply in areas where there is a shortage of trained 
personnel as is the case in Venda. 
The general validity of the conclusions reached in this study would, however, have to be refined further 
before they could be experimentally tested, but it is hoped that this study will act as an input for more 
generalised conclusions regarding the role of electricity supply in the broader context of development. 
Based on this consideration and in order to fully realise the impact as well as the benefits of electrification 
in Venda, the following recommendations are made: 
7.1 If significant participation in an electrification scheme is to be achieved, a new approach for the 
provision of more affordable electrical energy should· be investigated. This recommendation is 
made because the present direct private electricity costs to consumers are considered to be high 
relative to those pertaining to alternative sources of energy. As a result of this constraint, it is 
feared that electrical energy will rapidly become beyond the reach of a broad spectrum of 
consumers in Venda. Since this would deprive people of access to a modem lifestyle and other 
benefits of electrification, a package should be assembled to suit consumers with an income of as 
low as RSOO-OO per month. In the survey rmdings, it emerged that the present charges are already 
beyond the means of a significant number of consumers. 
7.2 The consumer awareness programme that brings the advantages of electricity to the notice of the 
Venda consumer and which is currently being undertaken by the marketing division of the Venda 
Electricity Corporation (VEe), should be vigorously intensified. To this end, the media could be of 
much assistance. At the same time, several pilot projects providing details of perceptions, 
preferences and affordability levels concerning the use of electrical energy could be included as a 
part of the consumer awareness programme. Such pilot projects may greatly facilitate the 
determination of the replicability of the project in Venda. 
7.3 VEC should continue to negotiate for more loans with the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDe) and "the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) with a view to developing existing 
and new systems to suit the challenges of Venda. 
7.4 The VEC should be significantly expanded to cater for the present high demand for electrical 
energy, the inspection of installations, the connection of houses, the reading of meters and the 
general maintenance of the scheme. This will, undoubtedly assist in ensuring the sustainability of 
the project. 
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APPENDIX A - QUESTIONNAIRE 
CONFIDENTIAL 
RHODES UNIVERSI1Y 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS QUESTIONNAIRE - 1988 
INTRODucnON 
The purpose of this questionnaire survey is to identify those private and social costs and 
benefits which need to be accounted for io analysiog the role of electricity io the process of 
development io Venda. 
INSTRUCflONS TO INVERVIEWER 
Fill in answer which best describes the respondent's opinion or mark correct block with cross 
(X) . 
A GENERAL 
1. Case number 
2. Name of fieldworker _________________ _ 
3. Date ______________________ _ 
4. Time at beginning of ioterview ______________ _ 
Time ioterview completed _______________ _ 
OJ 
B 
5. 
• 
•• 
• •• HOUSEHOLD PROFILE (as reported by the de facto head of the household ) 
What is your position in the household? 
Household head/father 
Household head/mother 
Grandparent 
Relative 
Child 
Other (specify), _________________ _ 
A de facto head of household is a person who stays in the housejbomestead permanently, who makes 
day-to-day decisions and is in cbarge . 
A bousebold is dermed as a group of persons sbaring a common table, and consequently contributing 
to a common budget. This includes lodgers, family members and relatives. 
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6. Complete the table for the household head (who is living at home) 
Formal Employment • •• Pension 
Informal Employ- and other grants 
meat 
Sex Age Educa- Yes/ If yes, Earnings Yes/ If yes, Earnings Yes/ If yes, 
(M/F) (years) tional No type and in rands . No type and in rands No amount 
••• 
Level place of per month place of per month 
(std employ- eontri- employ- eontri-
passed) meat buted to ment buted to 
household household 
. 
.. 
The informal sector involves a wide diversity of activities and an individual can be involved in one 
or more forms of non-wage money making. Informal sector activities include: 
a) Services provided from peoples' homes such as motor mechanics, herbalists, builders, barbers, 
tailors, dressmakers, evangelists, etc. 
b) Making things to sell such as clothes, mats or food, or selling fruit or vegetables from your garden. 
c) Buying things from shops or wholesalers to sell in smaller quantities. 
d) Running shacks hops or shebeens in their houses. 
in rands 
per 
month 
contri-
buted to 
house-
hold 
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C DEMOGRAPHICS OF OTHER HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 
7. Do any other members of your household receive a regular income? 
(e.g. from work, pensions, disability grants, maintenance grants, etc. 
Yes 
. No B 
8. If answer is YES to Question 7, complete the following table for both those living at home and 
migrants 
Formal Empoyment Informal Employment Pension 
and 
other 
grants 
First Rela- Sex Educa- Type and Earnings Type Earnings Amount 
Name tion to (MfF) tional place of oTrcmit- of or remit- in rands 
house- level employ- taneesin Acti- taneesin per 
hold (std ment rands per vity rands pe! month 
head passed month con- month con- con-
tributed tributed tnbuted 
to house- to house- to house-
hold hold hold 
1. -
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
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9. How many people are living permanently in this household? 
10. How long has the household lived at 
a) Makwarela? (years) _________________ _ 
h) Lufule? (years) ____ -.,. _______ ~ ____ _ 
11. Where did the household live before? ______________ _ 
12. How many rooms are there in your house/homestead? ________ _ 
D· TYPES OF FUEL USED BY TIlE HOUSEHOLD 
13. Do you want electricity? 
Explain why: 
14. Have you already paid the deposit fee for electricity? 
15. If answer is NO to Question 14, give reason 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
8 
8 
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16. If answer is YES to Question 14, how much have you paid? 
R ________________ _ 
17. What deposit fee would you be prepared to pay for electricity 
R ________________ _ 
18. Are you still using electricity in your house? 
19. If answer is NO to Question 18, give reason 
20. What fuel do you use for the following purposes? 
Yes 
No B 
COOKING HEATING LIGHTING 
(water, space) 
Al- oe- Sel- Never Al- Of- Sel- Never Al- Of- Sel- Never 
ways ten dom ways ten dom ways ten dom 
Wood 
Coal 
Dung 
Paraffin 
Gas 
Electricity 
Candles 
Other 
(Specify) 
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21. Complete the table 
Fuel •••• Cost Who How 
Used Where in fetches fetched 
fuel is rands fuel? e.g. bus 
obtained per Give car, 
e.g. haw- month fITst cart, 
kef, veld, name walk, 
forest etc. 
Wood 
Coal 
Dung 
Paraffin 
Gas 
Electricity I 
Candles I I I 
•••• In the case of electricity, please indicate if fuel is obtained from: 
powerlines supply (government) 
own generators 
batteries (e.g. car batteries) 
G 
OG 
B 
Distance Time No. 
per per of 
return return trips 
trip in trip per 
kms in month 
min-
utes 
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22. What electrical appliances do 
you now have in your house? 
Refrigerator 
Dishwasher 
Kettle 
Freezer 
Washing machine 
Power tools, 
e.g. vacuum cleaner 
Sewing/knitting 
machine 
TV 
Stove 
Hi-Ii 
Radio 
Iron 
Heater 
Geyser 
Other 
(specify) 
23. If you had electricity, what 
appliances would you buy? 
Refrigerator 
Dishwasher 
Kettle 
Freezer 
Washing machine 
Power tools, 
e.g. vacuum cleaner 
Sewing/knitting 
machine 
TV 
Stove 
Hi-Ii 
Radio 
Iron 
Heater 
Geyser 
Other 
(specify) _____ _ 
94 
24. Do you own any of the following non-electrical appliances? 
Gas heater 
Gas stove 
Gas lamp 
Gas geyser 
ParaffIn stove 
Paraffm lamp 
Paraffm heater 
Paraffm refrigerator 
Kettle 
Wood stove 
Coal stove 
Oil stove 
Iron 
Hi-fI 
Radio 
Sewing/knitting machine 
Other (specify) 
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25. Rank the following six statements about the direct benefits of electricity usage in terms of 
importance to your household. 
Please note that there are no ri&h! or wrong answers. What is important, is the respondent's 
opinion. Simply rank 1 to 6 with 1 = most important and 6 = least important. 
Statements 
To have light in the house (e.g. for studying) 
To have light to improve the security of the home 
To provide heat in the house 
To have electricity for cooking facilities 
To have hot water from geyser 
To have electricity for other appliances 
(e.g. hi-f~ TV, vacuum cleaner) 
26. Rank the following four statements about the indirect benefits of electricity usage in terms of 
importance to your household. 
Statements 
To reduce the risk of fue 
To have street lights 
To start your own business (knitting, sewing) 
Other (specify) _____________________ _ 
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27. Has any member of your household experienced any loss to property or personal injury due to 
accidents cause by: 
Gas 
Paraffm 
Wood 
Candles 
Electrical appliances 
Coal 
Dung 
28. If answer is YES to Question 27, explain and state if you made a claim: 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION. 
ANY OTHER COMMENTS: 
Yes . No 
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INSTRUCTION TO FIELDWORKERS 
1. Questionnaires must be filled in at the addresses printed on the cover of the questionnaire. 
2. All the fieldwork will be checked. If dishonesty is established, the fieldworker concerned will be 
dismissed immediately without payment for the work he has already done. 
3. When you arrive at a point of call, ask to speak to the head of the household. Explain to the 
household head who you are and what you are doing. Give the letter of introduction to 
him /her to read or read it aloud if necessary. 
5. Give the respondents enough time to answer the questions clearly and fully. 
7. Do not try to influence the respondent or put words in his mouth. If you think he has given 
wrong answers deliberately, make a note of it next to the questions on the questionnaire. 
8. After completing a questionnaire, go through it to make sure that you have not skipped any 
questions. 
9. Encourage respondents to look up records as far as possible. 
98 
VENDA ELECTRICITY CORPORATION 
KOPORASI Y A MUDAGASI Y A VENDA 
Incorporated In Venda In term. of the Corporations Act. (Act 17 of 1981) 
1988 July 21 
TO WHClI'1 IT MAY CCNCERN 
BLOCK D 
V D C BUILDINGS 
PRIVATE BAG 2539 
SIBASA, VENDA 
TEL.: (015581) 21062/3/4 
22912117 
FAX TEL.: 23131 
This is to introduce Mr. T.B. Themeli of the Economics Jleparonent of Rhodes University. 
He is undertaking research into the costs and benefits of surplying electricity to certain 
areas in Venda. 
I would appreciate it if you could assist him by answering various questions. 
Thanking you for your co-operation. 
Yours faithfully 
J . RODGER 
IEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
/msrn 
DIRECTORS: 
E MULAUOZI (Ch.lrmln), G B VAN SCHALKWYK, M R MAOULA. JJ S STEYN, SF MARAIS. MS MULOIWA. JT 1I00VHO. 
P B POWER, A F V VllJOEN. 
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RHODES UNIVERSITY 
P.O. Box 94, Grahamstown, 6140 South Africa 
Telegrams 'Rhodescol' Telex 24-4219 SA Telephone (0461) 2-2023 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
Dear Householder, 
SURVEY OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY AND USAGE IN VENDA 
- -
.. I am a post-graduate student in the Department of Economics at 
Rhodes University, currently undertaking research towards a 
master's degree. The subject of my research is the cost-benefit 
analysis of electricity supply in a less developed country o~ 
region , with particular reference to Yenda, 
I would therefore be extremely grateful if you would kindly 
assist my fieldworker, Mr in completing 
the accompanying short ques·";t'io::::n::-:a"l-=r::-e-. -----
Similar studies undertaken in the Republic of South Africa and 
elsewhere have elicited an excellent response and I hope that you 
will be wi lling to contribute by answering the questionaire to 
the success of this project relating particularly to Venda. 
I wish to assure you that ttie information gathered in this study 
wi ll be treated as strictly confidential, and used in such a way 
as to render it impossible to identify individual respondents . 
Should you have any quer ies about the survey, please telephone me 
at Thohoyandou (015581) 22119 or 31356. 
I look forward to your cooperation. 
Yours fai thfully, 
BOOI T. THEMELI (Student) 
~ ~ 
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Depar:ment of Ec onomic s and Economic History 
RHODES UNIVERSITY 
P.o . 80l 904 . Gr~h~milown . 61.0 !louIn "'Inn 
Tf'If'!!r ~m' Rhoof'~(or Tell!' l 2 • ..01 219 SA, Tetl"phone {046\ , 2·2023 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This is to confirm that Mr. B. T. Themeli is a 
Masters degree student in the Department of 
Economics and Econom ic His tory at Rhodes University, 
and that he is engaged in research into electricity 
supply and usage in Venda. Any hel p which you can 
give him in the survey wh ich he is undertak ing 
would be very much apprecia t ed. 
Yours s incere ly, 
R. T. BELL 
Professor and Head of De~artment 
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